This Text is from a Stratfor INSIGHT PDF or DocX Document it is about the Assasination of OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH.
The assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh (Arabic: محمود المبحوح, Maḥmūd al-Mabḥūḥ) (14 February 1961 – 19 January 2010) took place on 19 January 2010, in a Dubai hotel room. Al-Mabhouh—a co-founder of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the IslamistPalestinian group Hamas—was wanted by the Israeli government for the kidnapping and murder of two Israeli soldiers in 1989 as well as purchasing arms from Iran for use in Gaza; these have been cited as a possible motive for the assassination.[1] He also had many other enemies including Fatah (whose members “loathed” him), Egypt had imprisoned him for all of 2003, and Jordan’s intelligence services were looking for him.[2]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Mahmoud_Al-Mabhouh
This was an Mossad Israelian Operation behind own lines on the field of Dubai. This Insight will give a view more details on that actions also you will find WikiLeaks Related Cables of this Story right here:
http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10ABUDHABI103&q=al-mabhouh%20mahmoud
http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10DUBAI29&q=al-mabhouh%20mahmoud
The Following text is a copie from a Stratfor Intelligence Document and will give you another insight view of the Assasination.
THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH: A CLOSER LOOK
Editor’s Note: This intelligence brief is based on information and insight that STRATFOR analysts believe would be of interest to our clients and aid them in their security planning.
Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was found dead Jan. 20 in his room at Al-Bustan hotel in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Al-Mabhouh was a senior Hamas military commander and one of the founders of the Izz al-Deen al-Qassam Brigades. He was traveling to Dubai for an unknown meeting, presumably on sensitive Hamas business. According to STRATFOR sources, he had stopped in Dubai on his way to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials about prospective arms sales to Hamas. Al-Mabhouh was traveling without security. According to one report, this was due to the inability to purchase airfare for his bodyguards, though we suspect there might have been an operational reason for him to travel alone.
Dubai law enforcement authorities have ruled out natural causes in al-Mabhouh’s death and have identified as many as 17 individuals (15 men and two women) believed to have participated in the assassination on Jan. 19. Dubai law enforcement officials were able to track 11 of the 17 individuals through closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage back to their arrival at the Dubai International Airport 19 hours before the hit. The 11 individuals traveled to Dubai on passports from Ireland, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. They arrived at different times from different locations around Europe approximately 14 hours before al-Mabhouh arrived. The team also used several different high-pedestrian-traffic locations throughout Dubai — including at least three hotels and a shopping center — as meeting locations, logistics hubs and staging sites prior to the assassination.
Additionally, Dubai law enforcement officials were able to identify several reportedly encrypted international phone calls made from the phones of the suspected members of the assassination team to numbers in Austria, where Dubai authorities suspect a command and control center for the operation was based. The members of the teams had attempted to alter their physical appearance to varying degrees, from simply wearing a hat to donning wigs and glasses. Furthermore, the demeanor of the team members viewed in the CCTV footage did not deviate from that of any ordinary tourist or businessman who frequents Dubai, which indicates a high level of experience and professionalism.
Throughout the CCTV footage, it is very clear that the 17 members of the teams carried out specific roles in the operation. At least four surveillance teams were identified; three of the four teams appeared to work in pairs, while it seemed the fourth “team” consisted of a single individual. Another individual, who appeared to be the senior commander of the operation, apparently reserved the room across the hall from where al-Mabhouh was staying. The remaining seven members of the group appeared to serve as lookouts outside al-Mabhouh’s room and as the actual assassins.
The Operation Under Way
Prior to al-Mabhouh’s arrival in Dubai, the surveillance teams were positioned at the airport and at two hotels that al-Mabhouh was known to frequent when he traveled to Dubai. Once he arrived at Al-Bustan, two surveillance operatives located in the lobby were seen following him to his room. Once his room number had been confirmed, the two surveillants contacted the rest of the team, who then moved to Al-Bustan, where the hotel room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s was reserved by the senior commander. Al-Mabhouh then left Al-Bustan for a meeting with an unknown individual. CCTV footage shows one of the surveillance operatives watching al-Mabhouh get into a vehicle and then apparently describing the vehicle to others via cell phone.
After al-Mabhouh’s departure, two men and a woman, wearing wigs and glasses, and two two-man assassin teams staged themselves in the room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s room. Upon his return to Al-Bustan, al-Mabhouh is seen passing a disguised man and woman, who take up lookout positions near the elevator and outside al-Mabhouh’s room. Al-Mabhouh is intercepted and killed in his room by the two assassin teams. The surveillance teams then leave the premises, followed by the assassin teams and finally by the disguised team members. The 11 identified individuals flew out of Dubai International Airport between two and 10 hours after the assassination to different locations — such as South Africa, Hong Kong, Germany, France and Switzerland — long before a hotel cleaning crew discovered al-Mabhouh’s body at approximately 1:30 p.m. local time on Jan. 20.
The arrival of the team members 19 hours ahead of the operation and 14 hours ahead of al-Mabhouh indicates that the group or organization had prior knowledge of al-Mabhouh’s travel plans. Additionally, the coordinated movements and logistics involved in the operation typically require an advance team in place ahead of the assassination team’s arrival. Throughout the CCTV footage, some members of the team, specifically the actual assassins, seemed mindful of the surveillance cameras and moved in such a way as to block a direct view of their faces, while others were not as careful.
The team’s movements throughout the operation were methodical, calculated and well-choreographed. Their outward demeanor immediately before and after the killing was smooth and did not deviate from that of regular Dubai visitors. The tactics, tradecraft and logistics involved in this operation were well beyond the capabilities of known terror organizations and all but a few national intelligence services. While the CCTV footage does not offer any clues as to who carried out the assassination, is does display a high and rare degree of professionalism.
Protection Concerns
While al-Mabhouh was clearly engaged in questionable activities that made him a target for assassination, there are valuable lessons that can be learned from studying the tactics and tradecraft used in this operation as outlined in the videos found at these links:
(Part 1)
(Part 2)
(Part 3)
Many executive protection (EP) teams spend a great deal of time with their principals in foreign four- and five-star hotels similar to Al-Bustan. While these hotels offer a significantly higher level of security than some other venues, the assassination of al¬Mabouh is a clear example that there can be security risks inside the confines of even a high-end hotel.
Hotels are considered by many security teams to be relatively safe environments, and in a typical EP hotel scenario, designated members of the team, usually one close-protection agent (though occasionally two agents are used), escort the principal to and from his or her room. In some cases, the principal may even move around the hotel to use the gym, eat or attend meetings without his protection team.
The number of attackers involved in the assassination of al-Mabhouh could easily have overpowered one or two close-protection agents, especially if the assassins were able to achieve the element of surprise and were skilled fighters or used weapons. Furthermore, in such a scenario, the close-protection agent(s) would likely be targeted first, to remove the danger they pose before focusing on the principal.
The skill and degree of surveillance exhibited in the al-Mabhouh assassination would have been difficult for an EP team or targeted principal to detect and defend against. It is very difficult for EP agents to focus much attention on surveillance detection, especially in the case of a one- or two-man team. This underscores the need for a comprehensive and professionally trained countersurveillance (CS) team in such situations. The CS team focuses on the events and actors surrounding the principal and the EP detail, and by its very nature is in a far better position to detect hostile surveillance than close-protection agents are.
The surveillance of al-Mabhouh observed on the CCTV footage would likely have been picked up by a deployed CS team. The CS team could then have alerted the EP team to possible threats and allowed the EP team to increase the level of protection and/or notify the appropriate authorities. The very presence of a CS team could also serve to raise the risk of conducting such an operation to the point where another target would be selected.
The al-Mabhouh case also demonstrates the importance of EP teams keeping tabs on the individuals who occupy the hotel rooms in close proximity to their principals. Such rooms can be used as ambush sites when the principal walks through the hall, and in some cases, they can be used to gain entry to the principal’s room through adjoining doorways or from the exterior of the building.
Click to access 24875_DUBAI_brief_100219.pdf
http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php?topic=17438.0
####
DUBAI brief final doc & pdf
Date 2010-02-19 19:29:54
From mccullar@stratfor.com
To alfano@stratfor.com
scott.stewart@stratfor.com
alex.posey@stratfor.com
Others InReplyTo: 6670C261-657D-4B3E-AE15-88655672F734@stratfor.com
Attachments
24874_DUBAI_brief 100219_final.doc (476KiB)
24875_DUBAI_brief_100219.pdf (112.2KiB)
Text
Here ya go.
—
Michael McCullar
Senior Editor, Special Projects
STRATFOR
E-mail: mccullar@stratfor.com
Tel: 512.744.4307
Cell: 512.970.5425
Fax: 512.744.4334
http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2013-02-10-00-dubai-brief-final-doc-and-pdf.html
intelligenceleaks 