The following Stratfor EMail is from 2010-08-26 00:05:54 and gives you a point of view on the Iranian / Syrian and Saudi Relations and problems in 2010.
Date 2010-08-26 00:05:54
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Geography (as opposed to demography) explains why Iraq is a much bigger
priority for Iran than Lebanon. From the Iranian pov, they can’t achieve
much more than what they have already in Lebanon because they are
dependent upon Syrian cooperation which is waning. And because of the
Saudi moves. Rather the ones from the Turks, whom the Iranians don’t want
to irk. From the Iranians pov, Lebanon is a key outpost of Iranian
influence but with limited value. They have to compete with the Syrians,
Saudis, and Turks. Not to mention the Israelis. Ideally, the IRI after it
was established would have liked to focus on Iraq as opposed to Lebanon
but it couldn’t because of the Baathist regime there and the war it
imposed on the Iranians. In contrast, the ’82 Israeli invasion of Lebanon
provided the Iranians with an opening. They had help from the Syrians who
at the time were enemies of the Iraqis, had the Israeli threat, which was
magnified because of the Turkish-Israeli alignment, and were also seen as
a pariah in the Arab world because of the Alawite nature of the regime.
So, Damascus sought alignment with Iran. Now that the regional dynamics
have shifted, the Syrians are in the process of putting some distance
between themselves and the Iranians, Tehran sees that it may not be able
to manage its Lebanese asset as it used to though it needs it to keep the
Israelis from attacking them. This is why Iran despite seeing Iraq as the
priority will not yield on Hezbollah without a fight. In the end, what
will happen is that Hezbollah’s status as the premier non-state Iranian
proxy will be reduced several notches down to where it will be a
pro-Iranian political force in Lebanon. For the Saudis and the Arabs, if
they can achieve this then they would have compensated for the loss of
Iraq. For them the Iranian threat becomes much more manageable as long as
they don’t have to worry about the Iranians being in their front and
backyard.
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On 8/25/2010 5:49 PM, Reva Bhalla wrote:
er, sorry. that should say Syria edging away from Iran* below
On Aug 25, 2010, at 4:47 PM, Reva Bhalla wrote:
the first report really interested me because in considering who the
source is, who I think likes to channel information to the admin
through us, Iran may be trying to signal that they’re not worried
about what the US/Saudi/Turkey are doing with Syria and HZ — that’s
not what is going to compel them to negotiate. Their focus is on Iraq,
and they know they have the upper hand there. THen, think about the
serial bombings today…
On Aug 25, 2010, at 4:44 PM, Reginald Thompson wrote:
3 different reports from 3 different sources on Syria edging away
from Iran and revising the rules for Hezbollah. The first 2 are of
particular interest.
PUBLICATION: analysis/background
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Iranian diplomat
SOURCE Reliability : D
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
The US is definitely luring Syria to distance itself from Iran, and
is using Iraq as the incentive. With the major redeployment of US
troops in Iraq,in preparation for their withdrawal within a year,
the US is suggesting that Syria fills in the gap and dilute Shiite
fixation on Iran. The Saudis who worked hard to reinstate Syrian
influence in Lebanon are in the process of convincing the US that
Syria can be an asset in Iraq.
The Iranians do not prefer to resort to violence in dealing with
Syria. The source agrees that Tehran has the option of using Sunni
militants against the regime in Damascus. He adds that Iran
realizes, however, that Sunni militants cannot topple the regime in
Damascus. As he puts it, the militants’ impact on the Syrian regime
is not any more significant than that of the Katuyshas on Israel’s
security. Iran has the capacity to blunt Syrian initiatives in Iraq
without making too much noise. He says Iraq is secure in Iranian
hands. He admits, however, that HZ in Lebanon would be the casualty.
He notes that Iraq is much more important for Iran than the status
of HZ in Lebanon. He does not belittle the significance of HZ for
Iranian regional policy. He notes, nevertheless, that a major aim of
Iran’s regional policy is control of Iraq.Making compromises on HZ
in Lebanon may be a price that Iran has to pay for maintaining its
hold on Iraq. He says the Shiites in Lebanon do not constitute a
majority and that their current influence in Lebanon is tenuous and
depends on regional developments. Iraq is a different matter and
Iranian interests there are strategic. He says that Iran will by no
means sacrifice HZ without putting a fight. He says it is still
premature to speculate. He concludes saying that Iran’s greatest
asset in Syria is that Israel is not interested in peace with
Damascus. The Syrians know it and this is why they are not yet ready
to burn bridges with Tehran.
PUBLICATION: analysis/background
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Current advisor to Bashar al Assad, used to
advise Hafiz
SOURCE Reliability : D
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
Syria has finally got Hizbullah by the neck. He admits that HZ has
the capacity for sabotage in Syria. They have established strong
connections with many Iraqi Shiites currently living in Syria and
have actually set up many sleeping cells in the country, but
especially in Greater Damascus. They have very limited contacts with
Sunni militants because the Syrians are in full charge of the
borders with Iraq. Sunnis in al-Jazeera region in Syria, which is
contiguous with al-Anbar province in Iraq, are aversive to Shiites
and do not welcome al-Qaeda militants. They were staunchly
pro-Saddam Hussein and are on good terms with the Iraqi Ba’th Party.
It will be difficult for the Iranians to send to Syria al-Qaeda
militants since the security forces there know their infiltration
routes and likely contacts in the country. He says Sunni militants
cannot topple the regime in Damascus. The regime’s policy in dealing
with them is harsh and employs the “flattening” concept. By this he
refers to the policy of the late Hafiz Asad in dealing with the
Brotherhood’s insurgency in Hama in 1982.
Syria has no plan on taking on HZ in Lebanon as long as it does not
violate the existing rules of the game as they have been revised by
Syria, i.e., no takeover of Beirut. He says Syria knows how to keep
HZ bogged down in Lebanon and how to preoccupy it with petty
security concerns. He says what happened in Beirut last night is an
example of what Syria can do to HZ. He agrees that the clash between
HZ and al-Ahbash started over a personal matter, but Syrian agents
immediately took advantage of the situation and widened the scope of
the conflict.HZ knows that they are under strict orders to avoid
overrunning Beirut. He says Syria can easily repeat on a regular
basis last night’s incident. It takes no effort to start a fight
over a personal matter. As the source says: “the Lebanese have
strong egos. They are always eager to pull the trigger.” He says HZ
does not want to be drawn into routine skirmishes in the alleys of
Beirut because that would discredit it even among its own Shiite
partisans. Syria will tame HZ into submission.
PUBLICATION: analysis/background
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Turkish diplomat
SOURCE Reliability : C
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
Turkey will not allow Iran/HZ to destabilize the Asad regime. The
only group in Syria that has the potential to challenge the regime
is the Brotherhood.Turkey has great influence on the Brotherhood,
especially after it hosted its most recent congress in Istanbul,
which led to the rise to power of the radical Hama faction within
the movement. He says the new Brotherhood leadership will never take
aim at the Asad regime without Turkish authorization. He adds that
subversive acts against the Asad regime by other militant groups
will not amount to much. The Iranians know that the stability of the
Asad regime is a red line and that Turkey will not tolerate any
attempt to undermine it. Turkey has won over Hamas in Gaza. The
process of cornering Iran has begun, even though Turkey does not
have ill feelings, or sinister motives towards Iran.
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