The Following Stratfor EMail was written short after the US Drone Killing of the so called (since 2001) CIA Al-Quaida most wanted hit list. This case was a brake of all rules of human rights the US of A stands for by President Barack Hussein Obama II and the Bush Administration because they set him on a Kill List and wanted him dead.
The headhunting CIA suceeded this operation in late 2011, exactly on september 30th 2011.
The following EMail from strafor is giving you a great view into the connection between different intelligence agencys. Anwar al-Awlaki was murdered by a drone strike in yemen on sept. 30th it did not take long Stratfor Intelligence Service get the information of the succeed kill strike the same day.
Question posed to source:
Got any idea where we nailed Awlaki in your old goat stomping grounds?
Source response:
I understand it was in the south near Aden by drones. Good shot, I must say.
Drone Strike killing by a Predator 2 Drones.
My apologies — wrong source code was used on this one — please note
the change to SA701.
More info from the same source — question posed:
Indeed! Think manned or Global Hawk?
Response from source —
Unmanned from what I understand.
ATTRIBUTION: None
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Riyadh-based US security official
PUBLICATION: For background only
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: B
SPECIAL HANDLING: None
SOURCE HANDLER: Fred
Anwar al-Awlaki´s son – 16 years old was killed 2 weeks later the same way by US Officials ordered drone strikes.
This is part one of a series you can follow now on Intelligence Leaks all about WikiLeaks Global Intelligence Files and US Drone Killings in different countries.
Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari was sentenced to life in prison for attempting to build a bomb. He never build a bomb. He came to the US in 2008 to study chemical engineering. He had plans and he owned chemicals but he never attacked anyone anyway he faces now a life in prison.
In this Document you will see that the FBI Agent is clearly telling that he THINKS Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari is going to build a weapon of mass destruction as evidence his research of instructions, the research of potential targets, purchasing the material of chemicals and the needed ingredients are enough evidences for a person to sent him his whole life to prison.
Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari has been accused for a crime until today he has not done.
This is a part of his story.
(right click on a picture to show it in full screen mode)
This Text is from a Stratfor INSIGHT PDF or DocX Document it is about the Assasination of OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH.
The assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh (Arabic: محمود المبحوح, Maḥmūd al-Mabḥūḥ) (14 February 1961 – 19 January 2010) took place on 19 January 2010, in a Dubai hotel room. Al-Mabhouh—a co-founder of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the IslamistPalestinian group Hamas—was wanted by the Israeli government for the kidnapping and murder of two Israeli soldiers in 1989 as well as purchasing arms from Iran for use in Gaza; these have been cited as a possible motive for the assassination.[1] He also had many other enemies including Fatah (whose members “loathed” him), Egypt had imprisoned him for all of 2003, and Jordan’s intelligence services were looking for him.[2]
This was an Mossad Israelian Operation behind own lines on the field of Dubai. This Insight will give a view more details on that actions also you will find WikiLeaks Related Cables of this Story right here:
The Following text is a copie from a Stratfor Intelligence Document and will give you another insight view of the Assasination.
THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH: A CLOSER LOOK
Editor’s Note: This intelligence brief is based on information and insight that STRATFOR analysts believe would be of interest to our clients and aid them in their security planning.
Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was found dead Jan. 20 in his room at Al-Bustan hotel in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Al-Mabhouh was a senior Hamas military commander and one of the founders of the Izz al-Deen al-Qassam Brigades. He was traveling to Dubai for an unknown meeting, presumably on sensitive Hamas business. According to STRATFOR sources, he had stopped in Dubai on his way to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials about prospective arms sales to Hamas. Al-Mabhouh was traveling without security. According to one report, this was due to the inability to purchase airfare for his bodyguards, though we suspect there might have been an operational reason for him to travel alone.
Dubai law enforcement authorities have ruled out natural causes in al-Mabhouh’s death and have identified as many as 17 individuals (15 men and two women) believed to have participated in the assassination on Jan. 19. Dubai law enforcement officials were able to track 11 of the 17 individuals through closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage back to their arrival at the Dubai International Airport 19 hours before the hit. The 11 individuals traveled to Dubai on passports from Ireland, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. They arrived at different times from different locations around Europe approximately 14 hours before al-Mabhouh arrived. The team also used several different high-pedestrian-traffic locations throughout Dubai — including at least three hotels and a shopping center — as meeting locations, logistics hubs and staging sites prior to the assassination.
Additionally, Dubai law enforcement officials were able to identify several reportedly encrypted international phone calls made from the phones of the suspected members of the assassination team to numbers in Austria, where Dubai authorities suspect a command and control center for the operation was based. The members of the teams had attempted to alter their physical appearance to varying degrees, from simply wearing a hat to donning wigs and glasses. Furthermore, the demeanor of the team members viewed in the CCTV footage did not deviate from that of any ordinary tourist or businessman who frequents Dubai, which indicates a high level of experience and professionalism.
Throughout the CCTV footage, it is very clear that the 17 members of the teams carried out specific roles in the operation. At least four surveillance teams were identified; three of the four teams appeared to work in pairs, while it seemed the fourth “team” consisted of a single individual. Another individual, who appeared to be the senior commander of the operation, apparently reserved the room across the hall from where al-Mabhouh was staying. The remaining seven members of the group appeared to serve as lookouts outside al-Mabhouh’s room and as the actual assassins.
The Operation Under Way
Prior to al-Mabhouh’s arrival in Dubai, the surveillance teams were positioned at the airport and at two hotels that al-Mabhouh was known to frequent when he traveled to Dubai. Once he arrived at Al-Bustan, two surveillance operatives located in the lobby were seen following him to his room. Once his room number had been confirmed, the two surveillants contacted the rest of the team, who then moved to Al-Bustan, where the hotel room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s was reserved by the senior commander. Al-Mabhouh then left Al-Bustan for a meeting with an unknown individual. CCTV footage shows one of the surveillance operatives watching al-Mabhouh get into a vehicle and then apparently describing the vehicle to others via cell phone.
After al-Mabhouh’s departure, two men and a woman, wearing wigs and glasses, and two two-man assassin teams staged themselves in the room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s room. Upon his return to Al-Bustan, al-Mabhouh is seen passing a disguised man and woman, who take up lookout positions near the elevator and outside al-Mabhouh’s room. Al-Mabhouh is intercepted and killed in his room by the two assassin teams. The surveillance teams then leave the premises, followed by the assassin teams and finally by the disguised team members. The 11 identified individuals flew out of Dubai International Airport between two and 10 hours after the assassination to different locations — such as South Africa, Hong Kong, Germany, France and Switzerland — long before a hotel cleaning crew discovered al-Mabhouh’s body at approximately 1:30 p.m. local time on Jan. 20.
The arrival of the team members 19 hours ahead of the operation and 14 hours ahead of al-Mabhouh indicates that the group or organization had prior knowledge of al-Mabhouh’s travel plans. Additionally, the coordinated movements and logistics involved in the operation typically require an advance team in place ahead of the assassination team’s arrival. Throughout the CCTV footage, some members of the team, specifically the actual assassins, seemed mindful of the surveillance cameras and moved in such a way as to block a direct view of their faces, while others were not as careful.
The team’s movements throughout the operation were methodical, calculated and well-choreographed. Their outward demeanor immediately before and after the killing was smooth and did not deviate from that of regular Dubai visitors. The tactics, tradecraft and logistics involved in this operation were well beyond the capabilities of known terror organizations and all but a few national intelligence services. While the CCTV footage does not offer any clues as to who carried out the assassination, is does display a high and rare degree of professionalism.
Protection Concerns
While al-Mabhouh was clearly engaged in questionable activities that made him a target for assassination, there are valuable lessons that can be learned from studying the tactics and tradecraft used in this operation as outlined in the videos found at these links:
(Part 1)
(Part 2)
(Part 3)
Many executive protection (EP) teams spend a great deal of time with their principals in foreign four- and five-star hotels similar to Al-Bustan. While these hotels offer a significantly higher level of security than some other venues, the assassination of al¬Mabouh is a clear example that there can be security risks inside the confines of even a high-end hotel.
Hotels are considered by many security teams to be relatively safe environments, and in a typical EP hotel scenario, designated members of the team, usually one close-protection agent (though occasionally two agents are used), escort the principal to and from his or her room. In some cases, the principal may even move around the hotel to use the gym, eat or attend meetings without his protection team.
The number of attackers involved in the assassination of al-Mabhouh could easily have overpowered one or two close-protection agents, especially if the assassins were able to achieve the element of surprise and were skilled fighters or used weapons. Furthermore, in such a scenario, the close-protection agent(s) would likely be targeted first, to remove the danger they pose before focusing on the principal.
The skill and degree of surveillance exhibited in the al-Mabhouh assassination would have been difficult for an EP team or targeted principal to detect and defend against. It is very difficult for EP agents to focus much attention on surveillance detection, especially in the case of a one- or two-man team. This underscores the need for a comprehensive and professionally trained countersurveillance (CS) team in such situations. The CS team focuses on the events and actors surrounding the principal and the EP detail, and by its very nature is in a far better position to detect hostile surveillance than close-protection agents are.
The surveillance of al-Mabhouh observed on the CCTV footage would likely have been picked up by a deployed CS team. The CS team could then have alerted the EP team to possible threats and allowed the EP team to increase the level of protection and/or notify the appropriate authorities. The very presence of a CS team could also serve to raise the risk of conducting such an operation to the point where another target would be selected.
The al-Mabhouh case also demonstrates the importance of EP teams keeping tabs on the individuals who occupy the hotel rooms in close proximity to their principals. Such rooms can be used as ambush sites when the principal walks through the hall, and in some cases, they can be used to gain entry to the principal’s room through adjoining doorways or from the exterior of the building.
Text
Here ya go.
—
Michael McCullar
Senior Editor, Special Projects
STRATFOR
E-mail: mccullar@stratfor.com
Tel: 512.744.4307
Cell: 512.970.5425
Fax: 512.744.4334
This Leak will give you proof that CIA, Stratfor and you can easy imagine other Shadow Surveillance Agencys are monitoring the world wide web social medias.
They are talking about in that following leaked EMails.
Have suspected this, but provides an idea of the scope of the surveillance.
CIA Open Source Center in charge of following these social websites. Used to provide a quick sweep of reaction to world events. Have several hundred analysts. Follow about 5 million tweets a day. The listed examples were to the death of UBL, social responses to Obama’s Middle East speech. Started to use this media after the Green Revo. in Iran and how Twitter impacted that. Thought that they would have started monitoring these sites in a systematic way before that.
So what we all know and what we all thought before is now leaked and you have it black and white on your screen right now you as are reading this blogpost.
So there are three Points in that EMail and on two of those I want to shine some light on.
3 things 1. Their job is very very similar to ours with better resources and different requirements 2. Note how they use, caveat, and compare their monitoring of social media 3. There is no organized monitoring of US domestic social media
1. Their job is very very similar to ours with better resources and different requirements
so at the first point Stratfor (SF) says that they are monitoring the social media too like the CIA but the CIA has more massive Computers and resources than SF and different requirements. The CIA Open Source Center was created after the attacks of 9/11 for a better state of the art surveillance of citizens and terrorist activities.
The OSC Leader at the moment is Douglas Naquin. you can imagine that within a more and more networked world through programs like facebook and twitter (spying machines) the resources must have been increased rapidly because we live in a new century of informations.
3. There is no organized monitoring of US domestic social media
this point I would call today a fail. because we know now that the NSA is building a huge Spy Center in USA Utah you can see and hear about this on Jacob Applebaums 29C3 keynote. So it is important to note that not only the CIA OSC, and Stratfor are monitoring Facebook and Twitter or other social medias – also The NSA and for sure Germanys BND and other surveillance Agencys are up into the great spying machine called the internet. and the social media networks are their most powerful tools.
watch full or start at 11:23.
the mail goes on with an important note of an agent.
3. Don’t bet on it. It’s just better hidden
So he claims to be that point 3 is not valid and the monitoring is just better hidden. this is an important note because it is NOT only the CIAs open source center who is monitoring all that social media networks there is more hidden surveillance in the state and all around the internet.
No, not OSC From: Sean Noonan <sean.noonan@stratfor.com> Reply-To: <sean.noonan@stratfor.com>, CT AOR <ct@stratfor.com> Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2011 17:50:07 +0000 To: CT AOR <ct@stratfor.com> Subject: Re: [CT] US/SECURITY – AP Exclusive: CIA following Twitter, Facebook By the CIA OSC?
So what are those important points to know, what can you do to get not in the view of spys and secret agents. well this is way difficult to say. at first try to be anonymous as possible if you don´t want to get “”visited”” by unknown.
use often nicknames on the web. try things like the tor browser and use unix / Linux systems for a better control of your system. you can use VPN and create different mail accounts.
at least it is up to all of you with whom do you talk and what do you share – do you need your real name in facebook? do you need to post pictures of your friends or the latest party? think before posting. what is important what do you need to say and what is to much private information?
I am sure if someone would stay in your house or appartment watching you all the time face 2 face you do not know him and he is not much talking to you. you wouldn´t share or your personal stuff with him. you would ask him to leave.
Talk about this on WikiLeaks Forum (or on this blog 😉 )
This Mail is from september 2011 and it is about the CIA and the ISI (Pakistan military Intelligence Agency = Inter-Services Intelligence) in Pakistan and it is about the opressing power of the USA in that country. Stratfor Member comments on this Insight View are like: “I find it more interesting that the Agency has declared an internal intelligence war on ISI” and more on that below on the EMail: “Nobody is trusted.” furthermore they say the “CIA” is using “Moscow Rules.” against Pakistan and the ISI.
“The Agency is operating against Pakistan with Moscow Rules.
ISI is an enemy combatant.
The EMail comes from a “STRATFOR’s Pakistani sources” the source said: “I am getting the sense that the United States has decided to coerce Pakistan into compliance.” …, further it goes “If it continues on its current path then the U.S. could escalate matters further and engage in fixed wing airstrikes against militant assets in North Waziristan….”the main Haqqani facility is next door to the Pak army divisional command in Miramshah.” The source call this a “collateral damage”…”So in addition to collateral damage given the densely populated area a U.S. assault on the facility could kill many Pak army personnel.”
Date 2011-09-28 15:12:30
From burton@stratfor.com
To sean.noonan@stratfor.com
secure@stratfor.com
Others MessageId:
InReplyTo: 1233806656-1317215394-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-528774114-@b28.c15.bise6.blackberry
Text
Smoking gun, Libya levels after La Belle Disco bombing.
I find it more interesting that the Agency has declared an internal
intelligence war on ISI.
Nobody is trusted.
On 9/28/2011 8:09 AM, Sean Noonan wrote:
I wonder how much signals intercept the US has to show the Paks
lying…….
———————————————————————-
From: Fred Burton
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 08:05:26 -0500 (CDT)
To: Kamran Bokhari
Cc:
Subject: Re: INSIGHT – U.S./PAKISTAN – Behind the escalation ***PROTECT
SOURCE & INTEL***
The ISI-CIA battles have moved into a freezing Cold War. Temperature
has dropped significantly.
The Agency is operating against Pakistan with Moscow Rules.
ISI is an enemy combatant.
On 9/27/2011 8:47 PM, Kamran Bokhari wrote:
SOURCE: PK00
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR’s Pakistani sources
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Pak ambo to DC
PUBLICATION: No
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: B/C
SPECIAL HANDLING: Not Applicable
SOURCE HANDLER: Kamran
DC has told Islamabad. Help us reconcile with those under your
influence. As for those that are not under your control, either you
take em out or let us do so. The Haqqanis are not entirely under
Pakistani control. They do a lot of independent stuff.
There was a conversation that Islamabad facilitated in the UAE between
DC and the Haqqanis but then these guys turned around and engaged in a
series of attacks. But the Pakistanis aren’t willing to take action
against them. Spoke with Mullen who told me he has been lied to by his
Pak counterparts.
On the Pakistani side, the problem is that they deeply mistrust the
Americans and suspect that the U.S. is going behind its back and
cutting its own deals with the insurgents. Look at how Tayyeb Agha is
missing after the revelations that the U.S. was dealing with him to
reach Mullah Omar. I am getting the sense that the United States has
decided to coerce Pakistan into compliance.
Islamabad still has some time to help de-escalate matters but not a
whole lot. If it continues on its current path then the U.S. could
escalate matters further and engage in fixed wing airstrikes against
militant assets in North Waziristan. The problem has been that the
main Haqqani facility is next door to the Pak army divisional command
in Miramshah.
So in addition to collateral damage given the densely populated area a
U.S. assault on the facility could kill many Pak army personnel. There
is a growing U.S. view that it can always come back to working with
Pakistan. But for now it may need to get tough to shape behavior.
intelligenceleaks 
