The Following Stratfor EMail was written short after the US Drone Killing of the so called (since 2001) CIA Al-Quaida most wanted hit list. This case was a brake of all rules of human rights the US of A stands for by President Barack Hussein Obama II and the Bush Administration because they set him on a Kill List and wanted him dead.
The headhunting CIA suceeded this operation in late 2011, exactly on september 30th 2011.
The following EMail from strafor is giving you a great view into the connection between different intelligence agencys. Anwar al-Awlaki was murdered by a drone strike in yemen on sept. 30th it did not take long Stratfor Intelligence Service get the information of the succeed kill strike the same day.
Question posed to source:
Got any idea where we nailed Awlaki in your old goat stomping grounds?
Source response:
I understand it was in the south near Aden by drones. Good shot, I must say.
Drone Strike killing by a Predator 2 Drones.
My apologies — wrong source code was used on this one — please note
the change to SA701.
More info from the same source — question posed:
Indeed! Think manned or Global Hawk?
Response from source —
Unmanned from what I understand.
ATTRIBUTION: None
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Riyadh-based US security official
PUBLICATION: For background only
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: B
SPECIAL HANDLING: None
SOURCE HANDLER: Fred
Anwar al-Awlaki´s son – 16 years old was killed 2 weeks later the same way by US Officials ordered drone strikes.
This is part one of a series you can follow now on Intelligence Leaks all about WikiLeaks Global Intelligence Files and US Drone Killings in different countries.
This Text is from a Stratfor INSIGHT PDF or DocX Document it is about the Assasination of OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH.
The assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh (Arabic: محمود المبحوح, Maḥmūd al-Mabḥūḥ) (14 February 1961 – 19 January 2010) took place on 19 January 2010, in a Dubai hotel room. Al-Mabhouh—a co-founder of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the IslamistPalestinian group Hamas—was wanted by the Israeli government for the kidnapping and murder of two Israeli soldiers in 1989 as well as purchasing arms from Iran for use in Gaza; these have been cited as a possible motive for the assassination.[1] He also had many other enemies including Fatah (whose members “loathed” him), Egypt had imprisoned him for all of 2003, and Jordan’s intelligence services were looking for him.[2]
This was an Mossad Israelian Operation behind own lines on the field of Dubai. This Insight will give a view more details on that actions also you will find WikiLeaks Related Cables of this Story right here:
The Following text is a copie from a Stratfor Intelligence Document and will give you another insight view of the Assasination.
THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH: A CLOSER LOOK
Editor’s Note: This intelligence brief is based on information and insight that STRATFOR analysts believe would be of interest to our clients and aid them in their security planning.
Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was found dead Jan. 20 in his room at Al-Bustan hotel in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Al-Mabhouh was a senior Hamas military commander and one of the founders of the Izz al-Deen al-Qassam Brigades. He was traveling to Dubai for an unknown meeting, presumably on sensitive Hamas business. According to STRATFOR sources, he had stopped in Dubai on his way to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials about prospective arms sales to Hamas. Al-Mabhouh was traveling without security. According to one report, this was due to the inability to purchase airfare for his bodyguards, though we suspect there might have been an operational reason for him to travel alone.
Dubai law enforcement authorities have ruled out natural causes in al-Mabhouh’s death and have identified as many as 17 individuals (15 men and two women) believed to have participated in the assassination on Jan. 19. Dubai law enforcement officials were able to track 11 of the 17 individuals through closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage back to their arrival at the Dubai International Airport 19 hours before the hit. The 11 individuals traveled to Dubai on passports from Ireland, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. They arrived at different times from different locations around Europe approximately 14 hours before al-Mabhouh arrived. The team also used several different high-pedestrian-traffic locations throughout Dubai — including at least three hotels and a shopping center — as meeting locations, logistics hubs and staging sites prior to the assassination.
Additionally, Dubai law enforcement officials were able to identify several reportedly encrypted international phone calls made from the phones of the suspected members of the assassination team to numbers in Austria, where Dubai authorities suspect a command and control center for the operation was based. The members of the teams had attempted to alter their physical appearance to varying degrees, from simply wearing a hat to donning wigs and glasses. Furthermore, the demeanor of the team members viewed in the CCTV footage did not deviate from that of any ordinary tourist or businessman who frequents Dubai, which indicates a high level of experience and professionalism.
Throughout the CCTV footage, it is very clear that the 17 members of the teams carried out specific roles in the operation. At least four surveillance teams were identified; three of the four teams appeared to work in pairs, while it seemed the fourth “team” consisted of a single individual. Another individual, who appeared to be the senior commander of the operation, apparently reserved the room across the hall from where al-Mabhouh was staying. The remaining seven members of the group appeared to serve as lookouts outside al-Mabhouh’s room and as the actual assassins.
The Operation Under Way
Prior to al-Mabhouh’s arrival in Dubai, the surveillance teams were positioned at the airport and at two hotels that al-Mabhouh was known to frequent when he traveled to Dubai. Once he arrived at Al-Bustan, two surveillance operatives located in the lobby were seen following him to his room. Once his room number had been confirmed, the two surveillants contacted the rest of the team, who then moved to Al-Bustan, where the hotel room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s was reserved by the senior commander. Al-Mabhouh then left Al-Bustan for a meeting with an unknown individual. CCTV footage shows one of the surveillance operatives watching al-Mabhouh get into a vehicle and then apparently describing the vehicle to others via cell phone.
After al-Mabhouh’s departure, two men and a woman, wearing wigs and glasses, and two two-man assassin teams staged themselves in the room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s room. Upon his return to Al-Bustan, al-Mabhouh is seen passing a disguised man and woman, who take up lookout positions near the elevator and outside al-Mabhouh’s room. Al-Mabhouh is intercepted and killed in his room by the two assassin teams. The surveillance teams then leave the premises, followed by the assassin teams and finally by the disguised team members. The 11 identified individuals flew out of Dubai International Airport between two and 10 hours after the assassination to different locations — such as South Africa, Hong Kong, Germany, France and Switzerland — long before a hotel cleaning crew discovered al-Mabhouh’s body at approximately 1:30 p.m. local time on Jan. 20.
The arrival of the team members 19 hours ahead of the operation and 14 hours ahead of al-Mabhouh indicates that the group or organization had prior knowledge of al-Mabhouh’s travel plans. Additionally, the coordinated movements and logistics involved in the operation typically require an advance team in place ahead of the assassination team’s arrival. Throughout the CCTV footage, some members of the team, specifically the actual assassins, seemed mindful of the surveillance cameras and moved in such a way as to block a direct view of their faces, while others were not as careful.
The team’s movements throughout the operation were methodical, calculated and well-choreographed. Their outward demeanor immediately before and after the killing was smooth and did not deviate from that of regular Dubai visitors. The tactics, tradecraft and logistics involved in this operation were well beyond the capabilities of known terror organizations and all but a few national intelligence services. While the CCTV footage does not offer any clues as to who carried out the assassination, is does display a high and rare degree of professionalism.
Protection Concerns
While al-Mabhouh was clearly engaged in questionable activities that made him a target for assassination, there are valuable lessons that can be learned from studying the tactics and tradecraft used in this operation as outlined in the videos found at these links:
(Part 1)
(Part 2)
(Part 3)
Many executive protection (EP) teams spend a great deal of time with their principals in foreign four- and five-star hotels similar to Al-Bustan. While these hotels offer a significantly higher level of security than some other venues, the assassination of al¬Mabouh is a clear example that there can be security risks inside the confines of even a high-end hotel.
Hotels are considered by many security teams to be relatively safe environments, and in a typical EP hotel scenario, designated members of the team, usually one close-protection agent (though occasionally two agents are used), escort the principal to and from his or her room. In some cases, the principal may even move around the hotel to use the gym, eat or attend meetings without his protection team.
The number of attackers involved in the assassination of al-Mabhouh could easily have overpowered one or two close-protection agents, especially if the assassins were able to achieve the element of surprise and were skilled fighters or used weapons. Furthermore, in such a scenario, the close-protection agent(s) would likely be targeted first, to remove the danger they pose before focusing on the principal.
The skill and degree of surveillance exhibited in the al-Mabhouh assassination would have been difficult for an EP team or targeted principal to detect and defend against. It is very difficult for EP agents to focus much attention on surveillance detection, especially in the case of a one- or two-man team. This underscores the need for a comprehensive and professionally trained countersurveillance (CS) team in such situations. The CS team focuses on the events and actors surrounding the principal and the EP detail, and by its very nature is in a far better position to detect hostile surveillance than close-protection agents are.
The surveillance of al-Mabhouh observed on the CCTV footage would likely have been picked up by a deployed CS team. The CS team could then have alerted the EP team to possible threats and allowed the EP team to increase the level of protection and/or notify the appropriate authorities. The very presence of a CS team could also serve to raise the risk of conducting such an operation to the point where another target would be selected.
The al-Mabhouh case also demonstrates the importance of EP teams keeping tabs on the individuals who occupy the hotel rooms in close proximity to their principals. Such rooms can be used as ambush sites when the principal walks through the hall, and in some cases, they can be used to gain entry to the principal’s room through adjoining doorways or from the exterior of the building.
Text
Here ya go.
—
Michael McCullar
Senior Editor, Special Projects
STRATFOR
E-mail: mccullar@stratfor.com
Tel: 512.744.4307
Cell: 512.970.5425
Fax: 512.744.4334
The following EMail gives you a view on President Barak Obamas Leak Investigations – This EMail was not for the Public and marked as “internal use only – pls do not forward”
burton@stratfor.com claims in this EMail a view on Obamas Anti Leaking Investigations not only against Whistleblowers even on journalists that speak out agains Barak Obama.
Brennan is behind the witch hunts of investigative journalists learning information from inside the beltway sources.
This information now is called by me a way interessting stuff as this mail was written John O. Brennan still was obamas chief counterterrorism advisor and now in 2013 he has been turned into the chief director of Central Intelligence Agency.
So not only the hunt on whistleblowers has been opened also the hunt on investigative journalism this is an act against any democratic law and freedom of press.
but this mail will offer you some more information let´s follow the second quote:
Note — There is specific tasker from the WH to go after anyone printing materials negative to the Obama agenda (oh my.) Even the FBI is shocked. The Wonder Boys must be in meltdown mode..
Here is the second proof that an task direct from the white house (WH) comes to hunt investigative journalists that print anything negative on the president of the united states. even the FBI had knowledge of this tasker and is in this mail claimed to be shocked.
So the war on whistleblowers is not the only agenda on the white houses tasks it also includes investigative journalism and anything else that speaks negative on Mr. Obama using leaks or wikileaks as a source or using own collected material that could shine negative loght on the white house.
The following EMail will give you a view on chinese Internet SSL/TLS Security and cloud computing in china. The Source of this EMAil is an Stratfor called “Professional hacker” with an own “internet security company that consultswith companies globally including China”. Cloud Computing is one of the most common services providers deliver these days to their users/employees also for companies and agencys in china. but there is still a high risk in china if the websites are hosted in the country. It is way easy for the chinese government to intercept your SSL/TLS connection in china because they have root certificates in their browsers – “can still intercept and see SSL/TLS encrypted traffic because “Chinese
governments can still intercept and see SSL/TLS encrypted traffic because they have root certificates in the browser.” and there is nothing a private person or a company can do against this. The source claims that this is “especially true if they manage the infrastructure and don’t just provide hosting.”
you can see the whole EMail follows here:
INSIGHT – CHINA – Cloud Computing – CN64
Date 2011-02-15 20:51:29
From michael.wilson@stratfor.com
To analysts@stratfor.com
Others Listname: mailto:analysts@stratfor.com
MessageId:
InReplyTo: 4D5ACE22.2000406@stratfor.com
Text
**In response to what we just wrote on the CSM
SOURCE: CN64
ATTRIBUTION: Professional hacker
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Owns his own internet security company that consults
with companies globally including China
PUBLICATION: Yes
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 1
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SPECIAL HANDLING: None
SOURCE HANDLER: Jen
In concept this article is factually correct that it is possible (although
the word “clouds” is probably not ideal – “cloud network” is better).
Some might say things like “Well we only use SSL/TLS connections to the
machines, and we have XYZ security in place to prevent direct tampering.”
The problem is if the site is located within China, the Chinese
governments can still intercept and see SSL/TLS encrypted traffic because
they have root certificates in the browser. Once something is in the
physical hands of the enemy there is virtually nothing that the end
company can do. That is especially true if they manage the infrastructure
and don’t just provide hosting. Overall I think it’s a bad idea for
everyone but China. But I’m sure they’d say the same regarding the NSA’s
spying activities, https://www.eff.org/nsa/hepting So it’s a bit like the
pot calling the kettle black.
—
Jennifer Richmond
China Director
Director of International Projects
richmond@stratfor.com
(512) 744-4324 http://www.stratfor.com
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Well-connected guy in Indian policy, military,
financial circles
SOURCE Reliability : B
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 2
SPECIAL HANDLING: N/A
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
On a macro view – no these protests were not planned to be violent. Yes,
this year was a bit different – like a bubble which has been building up;
but also China’s global role vis a vis the Olympics played a role. To my 2
cents, there is no sign of India’s involvement – if you were to look,
India has been squirming to get an official reaction out. India does not
want any China-related issue to be raised – the government is too reticent
to bring any India-China issue away from the “dialogue”.
The following EMail shows you a conflict between Pakistan Forces and US Troops. the EMail is dated on 10/5/10 12:23PM and comes from a Newly promoted Lt-Gen and appointed head of the 1st Corps.Used to run the Frontier Corps before that. He is Talking about a case of friendly fire and he gives a view on the US Army work. He claims that the Army has make several mistakes and started a friendly fire situation:
“They picked up an Afghan source who deliberately mislead them into engaging
our post. The enquiry reveals that the US pilots having lived in the
area for 11 months did not even know the geography and had not marked
their maps. They did not use the instruments that we had put into place
for coordination i.e. liaison officers, joint border coordination cell
or the video conferencing…..”it was a case of friendly fire (it was
gross incompetence and total lack of concern), This has no impact (
everyday there is a squeal form some quarter or another). I want a
public apology…”
“They did not use the instruments that we had put into place for
coordination i.e. liaison officers, joint border coordination cell or the
video conferencing.”The seems to go along with the reports that US was going it alone without
the pakistanis when targetting haqqani network. And this is what happens
when you do that.
……..I almost have to wonder if the Pakistanis, faced with US forces
going on there own to target Haqqani, facilitated this afghan source
because they wante to show the US that bad things happen when US tries to
go alone
On 10/5/10 12:23 PM, Kamran Bokhari wrote:
CODE: PK7
PUBLICATION: Analysis
DESCRIPTION: Newly promoted Lt-Gen and appointed head of the 1st Corps.
Used to run the Frontier Corps until last week.
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR sources in Pakistan
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 1
SPECIAL HANDLING: Not Applicable
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
HANDLER: Kamran
Kamran, good to hear from you. Thank you for your kind sentiments. I
have taken over 1 Corps which is transitioning into Central Command for
the Pak Army i.e. it shall coordinate operations for 30 and 11 Corps
while maintaining 1 Corps and 19 Division as well as the FC as direct
command troops. Its not there yet and will take a while before it really
completes the transformation. The killing of the troops was based on
typical arrogance and ignorance that is a trait of the US Army. They
picked up an Afghan source who deliberately mislead them into engaging
our post. The enquiry reveals that the US pilots having lived in the
area for 11 months did not even know the geography and had not marked
their maps. They did not use the instruments that we had put into place
for coordination i.e. liaison officers, joint border coordination cell
or the video conferencing. As such my response was swift, serious and
conclusive. The ball is in their court; the FC cannot be treated like
this and I had told them, no drones or cross border activity in my AOR
since I am clear what to do. You can use this information but please do
not quote me since it will be a breach of institutional ethics. You
shall hear a mix of confused statements, i.e. we are looking for
alternative routes ( I know nothing can support operations as this route
so that is a lot of bull), that the road will open soon, (it will only
open when we are satisfied), it was a case of friendly fire (it was
gross incompetence and total lack of concern), This has no impact (
everyday there is a squeal form some quarter or another). I want a
public apology, compensation for the families of the shaheeds and
wounded, new rules of engagement, punishment for the offenders,
definition of a no fly zone parallel to the border. Take care and watch
the fun.
—
Michael Wilson
Senior Watch Officer, STRATFOR
Office: (512) 744 4300 ex. 4112
Email: michael.wilson@stratfor.com
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