The Following Stratfor EMail was written short after the US Drone Killing of the so called (since 2001) CIA Al-Quaida most wanted hit list. This case was a brake of all rules of human rights the US of A stands for by President Barack Hussein Obama II and the Bush Administration because they set him on a Kill List and wanted him dead.
The headhunting CIA suceeded this operation in late 2011, exactly on september 30th 2011.
The following EMail from strafor is giving you a great view into the connection between different intelligence agencys. Anwar al-Awlaki was murdered by a drone strike in yemen on sept. 30th it did not take long Stratfor Intelligence Service get the information of the succeed kill strike the same day.
Question posed to source:
Got any idea where we nailed Awlaki in your old goat stomping grounds?
Source response:
I understand it was in the south near Aden by drones. Good shot, I must say.
Drone Strike killing by a Predator 2 Drones.
My apologies — wrong source code was used on this one — please note
the change to SA701.
More info from the same source — question posed:
Indeed! Think manned or Global Hawk?
Response from source —
Unmanned from what I understand.
ATTRIBUTION: None
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Riyadh-based US security official
PUBLICATION: For background only
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: B
SPECIAL HANDLING: None
SOURCE HANDLER: Fred
Anwar al-Awlaki´s son – 16 years old was killed 2 weeks later the same way by US Officials ordered drone strikes.
This is part one of a series you can follow now on Intelligence Leaks all about WikiLeaks Global Intelligence Files and US Drone Killings in different countries.
This Text is from a Stratfor INSIGHT PDF or DocX Document it is about the Assasination of OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH.
The assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh (Arabic: محمود المبحوح, Maḥmūd al-Mabḥūḥ) (14 February 1961 – 19 January 2010) took place on 19 January 2010, in a Dubai hotel room. Al-Mabhouh—a co-founder of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the IslamistPalestinian group Hamas—was wanted by the Israeli government for the kidnapping and murder of two Israeli soldiers in 1989 as well as purchasing arms from Iran for use in Gaza; these have been cited as a possible motive for the assassination.[1] He also had many other enemies including Fatah (whose members “loathed” him), Egypt had imprisoned him for all of 2003, and Jordan’s intelligence services were looking for him.[2]
This was an Mossad Israelian Operation behind own lines on the field of Dubai. This Insight will give a view more details on that actions also you will find WikiLeaks Related Cables of this Story right here:
The Following text is a copie from a Stratfor Intelligence Document and will give you another insight view of the Assasination.
THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH: A CLOSER LOOK
Editor’s Note: This intelligence brief is based on information and insight that STRATFOR analysts believe would be of interest to our clients and aid them in their security planning.
Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was found dead Jan. 20 in his room at Al-Bustan hotel in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Al-Mabhouh was a senior Hamas military commander and one of the founders of the Izz al-Deen al-Qassam Brigades. He was traveling to Dubai for an unknown meeting, presumably on sensitive Hamas business. According to STRATFOR sources, he had stopped in Dubai on his way to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials about prospective arms sales to Hamas. Al-Mabhouh was traveling without security. According to one report, this was due to the inability to purchase airfare for his bodyguards, though we suspect there might have been an operational reason for him to travel alone.
Dubai law enforcement authorities have ruled out natural causes in al-Mabhouh’s death and have identified as many as 17 individuals (15 men and two women) believed to have participated in the assassination on Jan. 19. Dubai law enforcement officials were able to track 11 of the 17 individuals through closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage back to their arrival at the Dubai International Airport 19 hours before the hit. The 11 individuals traveled to Dubai on passports from Ireland, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. They arrived at different times from different locations around Europe approximately 14 hours before al-Mabhouh arrived. The team also used several different high-pedestrian-traffic locations throughout Dubai — including at least three hotels and a shopping center — as meeting locations, logistics hubs and staging sites prior to the assassination.
Additionally, Dubai law enforcement officials were able to identify several reportedly encrypted international phone calls made from the phones of the suspected members of the assassination team to numbers in Austria, where Dubai authorities suspect a command and control center for the operation was based. The members of the teams had attempted to alter their physical appearance to varying degrees, from simply wearing a hat to donning wigs and glasses. Furthermore, the demeanor of the team members viewed in the CCTV footage did not deviate from that of any ordinary tourist or businessman who frequents Dubai, which indicates a high level of experience and professionalism.
Throughout the CCTV footage, it is very clear that the 17 members of the teams carried out specific roles in the operation. At least four surveillance teams were identified; three of the four teams appeared to work in pairs, while it seemed the fourth “team” consisted of a single individual. Another individual, who appeared to be the senior commander of the operation, apparently reserved the room across the hall from where al-Mabhouh was staying. The remaining seven members of the group appeared to serve as lookouts outside al-Mabhouh’s room and as the actual assassins.
The Operation Under Way
Prior to al-Mabhouh’s arrival in Dubai, the surveillance teams were positioned at the airport and at two hotels that al-Mabhouh was known to frequent when he traveled to Dubai. Once he arrived at Al-Bustan, two surveillance operatives located in the lobby were seen following him to his room. Once his room number had been confirmed, the two surveillants contacted the rest of the team, who then moved to Al-Bustan, where the hotel room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s was reserved by the senior commander. Al-Mabhouh then left Al-Bustan for a meeting with an unknown individual. CCTV footage shows one of the surveillance operatives watching al-Mabhouh get into a vehicle and then apparently describing the vehicle to others via cell phone.
After al-Mabhouh’s departure, two men and a woman, wearing wigs and glasses, and two two-man assassin teams staged themselves in the room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s room. Upon his return to Al-Bustan, al-Mabhouh is seen passing a disguised man and woman, who take up lookout positions near the elevator and outside al-Mabhouh’s room. Al-Mabhouh is intercepted and killed in his room by the two assassin teams. The surveillance teams then leave the premises, followed by the assassin teams and finally by the disguised team members. The 11 identified individuals flew out of Dubai International Airport between two and 10 hours after the assassination to different locations — such as South Africa, Hong Kong, Germany, France and Switzerland — long before a hotel cleaning crew discovered al-Mabhouh’s body at approximately 1:30 p.m. local time on Jan. 20.
The arrival of the team members 19 hours ahead of the operation and 14 hours ahead of al-Mabhouh indicates that the group or organization had prior knowledge of al-Mabhouh’s travel plans. Additionally, the coordinated movements and logistics involved in the operation typically require an advance team in place ahead of the assassination team’s arrival. Throughout the CCTV footage, some members of the team, specifically the actual assassins, seemed mindful of the surveillance cameras and moved in such a way as to block a direct view of their faces, while others were not as careful.
The team’s movements throughout the operation were methodical, calculated and well-choreographed. Their outward demeanor immediately before and after the killing was smooth and did not deviate from that of regular Dubai visitors. The tactics, tradecraft and logistics involved in this operation were well beyond the capabilities of known terror organizations and all but a few national intelligence services. While the CCTV footage does not offer any clues as to who carried out the assassination, is does display a high and rare degree of professionalism.
Protection Concerns
While al-Mabhouh was clearly engaged in questionable activities that made him a target for assassination, there are valuable lessons that can be learned from studying the tactics and tradecraft used in this operation as outlined in the videos found at these links:
(Part 1)
(Part 2)
(Part 3)
Many executive protection (EP) teams spend a great deal of time with their principals in foreign four- and five-star hotels similar to Al-Bustan. While these hotels offer a significantly higher level of security than some other venues, the assassination of al¬Mabouh is a clear example that there can be security risks inside the confines of even a high-end hotel.
Hotels are considered by many security teams to be relatively safe environments, and in a typical EP hotel scenario, designated members of the team, usually one close-protection agent (though occasionally two agents are used), escort the principal to and from his or her room. In some cases, the principal may even move around the hotel to use the gym, eat or attend meetings without his protection team.
The number of attackers involved in the assassination of al-Mabhouh could easily have overpowered one or two close-protection agents, especially if the assassins were able to achieve the element of surprise and were skilled fighters or used weapons. Furthermore, in such a scenario, the close-protection agent(s) would likely be targeted first, to remove the danger they pose before focusing on the principal.
The skill and degree of surveillance exhibited in the al-Mabhouh assassination would have been difficult for an EP team or targeted principal to detect and defend against. It is very difficult for EP agents to focus much attention on surveillance detection, especially in the case of a one- or two-man team. This underscores the need for a comprehensive and professionally trained countersurveillance (CS) team in such situations. The CS team focuses on the events and actors surrounding the principal and the EP detail, and by its very nature is in a far better position to detect hostile surveillance than close-protection agents are.
The surveillance of al-Mabhouh observed on the CCTV footage would likely have been picked up by a deployed CS team. The CS team could then have alerted the EP team to possible threats and allowed the EP team to increase the level of protection and/or notify the appropriate authorities. The very presence of a CS team could also serve to raise the risk of conducting such an operation to the point where another target would be selected.
The al-Mabhouh case also demonstrates the importance of EP teams keeping tabs on the individuals who occupy the hotel rooms in close proximity to their principals. Such rooms can be used as ambush sites when the principal walks through the hall, and in some cases, they can be used to gain entry to the principal’s room through adjoining doorways or from the exterior of the building.
Text
Here ya go.
—
Michael McCullar
Senior Editor, Special Projects
STRATFOR
E-mail: mccullar@stratfor.com
Tel: 512.744.4307
Cell: 512.970.5425
Fax: 512.744.4334
This Mail is from september 2011 and it is about the CIA and the ISI (Pakistan military Intelligence Agency = Inter-Services Intelligence) in Pakistan and it is about the opressing power of the USA in that country. Stratfor Member comments on this Insight View are like: “I find it more interesting that the Agency has declared an internal intelligence war on ISI” and more on that below on the EMail: “Nobody is trusted.” furthermore they say the “CIA” is using “Moscow Rules.” against Pakistan and the ISI.
“The Agency is operating against Pakistan with Moscow Rules.
ISI is an enemy combatant.
The EMail comes from a “STRATFOR’s Pakistani sources” the source said: “I am getting the sense that the United States has decided to coerce Pakistan into compliance.” …, further it goes “If it continues on its current path then the U.S. could escalate matters further and engage in fixed wing airstrikes against militant assets in North Waziristan….”the main Haqqani facility is next door to the Pak army divisional command in Miramshah.” The source call this a “collateral damage”…”So in addition to collateral damage given the densely populated area a U.S. assault on the facility could kill many Pak army personnel.”
Date 2011-09-28 15:12:30
From burton@stratfor.com
To sean.noonan@stratfor.com
secure@stratfor.com
Others MessageId:
InReplyTo: 1233806656-1317215394-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-528774114-@b28.c15.bise6.blackberry
Text
Smoking gun, Libya levels after La Belle Disco bombing.
I find it more interesting that the Agency has declared an internal
intelligence war on ISI.
Nobody is trusted.
On 9/28/2011 8:09 AM, Sean Noonan wrote:
I wonder how much signals intercept the US has to show the Paks
lying…….
———————————————————————-
From: Fred Burton
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2011 08:05:26 -0500 (CDT)
To: Kamran Bokhari
Cc:
Subject: Re: INSIGHT – U.S./PAKISTAN – Behind the escalation ***PROTECT
SOURCE & INTEL***
The ISI-CIA battles have moved into a freezing Cold War. Temperature
has dropped significantly.
The Agency is operating against Pakistan with Moscow Rules.
ISI is an enemy combatant.
On 9/27/2011 8:47 PM, Kamran Bokhari wrote:
SOURCE: PK00
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR’s Pakistani sources
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Pak ambo to DC
PUBLICATION: No
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: B/C
SPECIAL HANDLING: Not Applicable
SOURCE HANDLER: Kamran
DC has told Islamabad. Help us reconcile with those under your
influence. As for those that are not under your control, either you
take em out or let us do so. The Haqqanis are not entirely under
Pakistani control. They do a lot of independent stuff.
There was a conversation that Islamabad facilitated in the UAE between
DC and the Haqqanis but then these guys turned around and engaged in a
series of attacks. But the Pakistanis aren’t willing to take action
against them. Spoke with Mullen who told me he has been lied to by his
Pak counterparts.
On the Pakistani side, the problem is that they deeply mistrust the
Americans and suspect that the U.S. is going behind its back and
cutting its own deals with the insurgents. Look at how Tayyeb Agha is
missing after the revelations that the U.S. was dealing with him to
reach Mullah Omar. I am getting the sense that the United States has
decided to coerce Pakistan into compliance.
Islamabad still has some time to help de-escalate matters but not a
whole lot. If it continues on its current path then the U.S. could
escalate matters further and engage in fixed wing airstrikes against
militant assets in North Waziristan. The problem has been that the
main Haqqani facility is next door to the Pak army divisional command
in Miramshah.
So in addition to collateral damage given the densely populated area a
U.S. assault on the facility could kill many Pak army personnel. There
is a growing U.S. view that it can always come back to working with
Pakistan. But for now it may need to get tough to shape behavior.
The following EMail will give you a view on chinese Internet SSL/TLS Security and cloud computing in china. The Source of this EMAil is an Stratfor called “Professional hacker” with an own “internet security company that consultswith companies globally including China”. Cloud Computing is one of the most common services providers deliver these days to their users/employees also for companies and agencys in china. but there is still a high risk in china if the websites are hosted in the country. It is way easy for the chinese government to intercept your SSL/TLS connection in china because they have root certificates in their browsers – “can still intercept and see SSL/TLS encrypted traffic because “Chinese
governments can still intercept and see SSL/TLS encrypted traffic because they have root certificates in the browser.” and there is nothing a private person or a company can do against this. The source claims that this is “especially true if they manage the infrastructure and don’t just provide hosting.”
you can see the whole EMail follows here:
INSIGHT – CHINA – Cloud Computing – CN64
Date 2011-02-15 20:51:29
From michael.wilson@stratfor.com
To analysts@stratfor.com
Others Listname: mailto:analysts@stratfor.com
MessageId:
InReplyTo: 4D5ACE22.2000406@stratfor.com
Text
**In response to what we just wrote on the CSM
SOURCE: CN64
ATTRIBUTION: Professional hacker
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Owns his own internet security company that consults
with companies globally including China
PUBLICATION: Yes
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 1
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SPECIAL HANDLING: None
SOURCE HANDLER: Jen
In concept this article is factually correct that it is possible (although
the word “clouds” is probably not ideal – “cloud network” is better).
Some might say things like “Well we only use SSL/TLS connections to the
machines, and we have XYZ security in place to prevent direct tampering.”
The problem is if the site is located within China, the Chinese
governments can still intercept and see SSL/TLS encrypted traffic because
they have root certificates in the browser. Once something is in the
physical hands of the enemy there is virtually nothing that the end
company can do. That is especially true if they manage the infrastructure
and don’t just provide hosting. Overall I think it’s a bad idea for
everyone but China. But I’m sure they’d say the same regarding the NSA’s
spying activities, https://www.eff.org/nsa/hepting So it’s a bit like the
pot calling the kettle black.
—
Jennifer Richmond
China Director
Director of International Projects
richmond@stratfor.com
(512) 744-4324 http://www.stratfor.com
The next EMail gives you a view on Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and the fincanially invovement of 1.5 Billion Dollar of this private security companys. the involvement has deep ties into the financial sectors – and it shows you clearly that war is money. the mail gives you also a view on who maybe is responsible in 2014 if the western army troops will leave the country completely.
Date 2010-10-27 15:04:22
From colibasanu@stratfor.com
To analysts@stratfor.com
Others Listname: mailto:analysts@stratfor.com
MessageId:
InReplyTo: AANLkTimqAcJaWmjjKHZ1aQwJuWbnxyY=OGCNPah3fVGv@mail.gmail.com
Text
CODE: AF3
PUBLICATION: Analysis
DESCRIPTION: Senior correspondent for Reuters in Kabul, an Afghan national
ATTRIBUTION: Not Applicable
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
SPECIAL HANDLING: Not Applicable
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
HANDLER: Kamran
Although under pressure from Washington to soften the decree and issue a
new joint ruling on the firms, Kabul is still defiant.
It has already seized hundreds of arms from smaller groups run by Afghan
companies as part of the process supposed to be completed by the end of
the year. those firms have closed now.
Those guarding compounds, companies, embassies and escorting
diplomats will be exempted from Karzai’s order.
There have been some bloody incidents by some members of the firms,
especially in the south in recent years.
The firms are not accountable to Kabul and in the face of the incidents
and with the ambitious plan for taking all security responsibilities by
2014, Karzai is keen to get this done.
Blackwater and few others run by some western officials are obviously not
happy because some 1.5 billion dollars are involved in the industry.
Hillary clinton rang Karzai on Saturday and the next day Karzai said he
would implement the ban and the following day we had new york times
talking how Karzai was getting cash in bags from Iran.
Also, Karzai a while back in a statement said the deadline for disbanding
the security firms will be extended until mid Feb.
The following EMail shows you the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the middle east, north africa connections and the arbaic world. the muslim brotherhood seems to play a big role in all this arab protests uprising all around the arab world. the EMails verified stratfor contact again comes from the FBI another part of this EMail is a “Syrian businessman with family links to the regime” – it gives you a short view of situation doen there and a view over the conflicts spreading around the countrys also the involvement of the muslim brotherhood.
Re: DISCUSSION – MB troubles
Date 2011-02-28 19:46:32
From burton@stratfor.com
To analysts@stratfor.com
Others Listname: mailto:analysts@stratfor.com
MessageId:
InReplyTo: 1703833745.930286.1298918683296.JavaMail.root@core.stratfor.com
Text
A few weeks back, I posted some info from the FBI on the status of the
MB in CONUS, if it helps.
Reva Bhalla wrote:
> To follow up Kamran’s big piece on the MB, would be a good idea to do
> a shorter follow-up assessment on the status of MB in Egypt
> (post-mubarak), Syria and Jordan
>
> Egyptian MB seems to be in trouble, no longer as capable of keeping a
> liberal face to the protest movement. this identity crisis is causing
> fractures within the movement as we saw today between the MB youth and
> the older leadership
>
> Syrian MB is trying to work up the guts, but they still fear a Hama repeat
>
> Jordanian MB is being accommodated by the king, but they are also
> being shown their limits
>
> Kamran, any thoughts on how coordination between the MB branches has
> evolved since the Eygpt unrest broke out? what are these guys saying
> on their email lists?
>
> ————————————————————————
> *From: *”Reva Bhalla”
> *To: *”Analyst List”
> *Sent: *Monday, February 28, 2011 12:40:02 PM
> *Subject: *INSIGHT – Syria/Libya/MB – MB protest plans and bashar’s
> diss to Q
>
>
> PUBLICATION: for analysis
> ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source
> SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Syrian businessman with family links to the regime
> SOURCE Reliability : C
> ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
> DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
> SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
>
> ** love the syrian excuse given to Q
>
> the Syrian MB is closely coordinating with the MB in Egypt, Jordan,
> Libya and Gaza and observing the course of developments in Libya. They
> expect the imminent demise in Qhaddafi and want to develop a mechanism
> for toppling Asad on the basis of what they learn from the experiences
> of protesters in other Arab countries. It would be foolish to try to
> oust Asad because the regime will react with unprecedented use of
> force. The MB have already decided on starting their protest in
> Aleppo in northern Syria. The MB are encouraged by the fact that
> Aleppo, which is Syria’s second largest city (although there are
> people in Syria who argue that the Aleppo Metropolis is the country’s
> largest), is only 20 kms away from the Turkish borders. They do not
> think the Turkish government will allow the regime in Damascus to use
> excessive violence against Aleppo which they make historical claims
> to. Syrian officials are contacting their Turkish counterparts to
> ensure Ankara does not intervene in the north. It is most unlikely
> that protests can initiate in Damascus, Homs or Hama because the
> regime can abort them immediately. Aleppo is another matter because
> this large city has never accepted inclusion in the state of Syria and
> had always wanted to be included in Iraq.
>
> The source added that Libyan president Mu’ammar Qhaddafi has called
> president Bashar Asad three times to request military assistance. He
> says Qhaddafi promised Asad billions of dollars if he could send
> troops by sea to Libya to defeat the insurgents. Asad told him he is
> unable to do so because the Syrian army is tied to the Golan front in
> anticipation of an Israeli attack
The following EMail(s) are/is again is from a Former FBI FCI agent – it gives you a short view into the history of chinese intelligence work and the political figures behind and involved. the internal problems and the near future of chinese intelligence services. the EMail is dated -2010-03-05 17:17:18-
Re: INSIGHT-CHINA-Background info on Chinese intelligence/political figures
Date 2010-03-05 17:17:18
From burton@stratfor.com
To sean.noonan@stratfor.com
Others MessageId:
InReplyTo: 4B912E59.60409@stratfor.com
Text
Yes
Sean Noonan wrote:
> this was from IC Smith right? (collating all the insight and adding a
> few modification to the CI China piece right now)
>
> Fred Burton wrote:
>> Interesting historical perspective.
>>
>> Kang sounds like a ruthless SOB.
>> ————————————————————————
>> *From: * Korena Zucha
>> *Date: *Thu, 25 Feb 2010 17:06:03 -0600
>> *To: *’Secure List’
>> *Subject: *INSIGHT-CHINA-Background info on Chinese
>> intelligence/political figures
>>
>> SOURCE: US701
>> ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR security source
>> SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Former FBI FCI agent
>> PUBLICATION: if desired
>> SOURCE RELIABILITY: Still testing, relatively new source
>> ITEM CREDIBILITY: 2
>> DISTRIBUTION: Secure
>> SPECIAL HANDLING: None
>> SOURCE HANDLER: Fred
>>
>> One of the characteristics of Chinese politics and this applies to the
>> intelligence/security agencies as well, is that rank is not always a
>> firm indicator of importance and power. Remember, Deng Xiaoping never
>> succeeded either Chairman Mao or Premier Zhou, but he was
>> unquestionably the man in charge. It is clear that Kang retained
>> great power and there are those who think Li Kenong was essentially
>> his mouthpiece. I’m not completely sure that’s the case, but at any
>> rate, Kang continued to wield immense power, really up to his death in
>> 1975. But historically I think he falls in that rather gray area
>> where they would just as soon that he is forgotten, but no one has the
>> courage to pull the trigger. And this is, in my view, for two
>> reasons. He was simply brutal (I’ve often times said that never in
>> the history of conflict have the two opposing intelligence chiefs been
>> so completely sadistic as was Kang Sheng and Dai Li.) and given that
>> historical brutality (where he is said to have killed more of his
>> friends than his enemies) it is easy for Chinese today to really not
>> want to remember him. In many ways, I find Kang the single most
>> interesting character coming out of the Chinese Civil War.
>>
>> But also, there is Kang’s role starting the Cultural Revolutionl.
>> Note how the Chinese treat the Gang of Four for instance, relegating
>> them to memories trash can, except to further dump on them, but Kang,
>> (and Mao) have escaped such criticism, relatively speaking. Kang was
>> never threatened during the CR as was Deng and others…including even
>> some of the more prominent generals, i.e.He Long. But most of the
>> future leaders were indeed, treated harshly by the Red Guards (one of
>> Deng’s sons, Deng Pufeng, was thrown out of a window and is in a
>> wheelchair today) and when I chatted with my friend who was affiliated
>> with the MPS/MSS, even he didn’t really want to discuss Kang.
>>
>> I think Kang is one of the more intriguing characters in Chinese
>> history that hasn’t gotten the notoriety and attention he really
>> deserves, though such books as those by Byron and Pack (The Claws of
>> the Dragon) and Faligot and Kauffer (The Chinese Secret Service) are
>> good starts.
>>
>> But his completely sinister background (though he is said to have been
>> able to write calligraphy with both hands, at the same time!) and his
>> role in the CR are the reasons, I believe, he isn’t lionized as
>> perhaps others, i.e. Mao, Zhou Enlai, Deng, Zhe De (who was treated
>> harshly during the CR), He Long, etc. etc.
>>
>> Re Zhou Yangkang….I don’t really know the extent of his influence,
>> but I doubt its as powerful as Kang’s was at the height of his power.
>> Actually, I’m of the opinion that one of the reasons Deng Xiaoping
>> formed the MSS is that he didn’t trust the MPS, which was Kang’s
>> organization and had treated Deng himself badly during the CR. But I
>> have no real idea as to the extent of Zhou’s influence.
>>
>> And as for Jia, he too, seems to have dropped off the scope in many
>> ways. I don’t know if that’s by choice or by design on the part of
>> the ruling elite, but he seems to be in complete
>> retirement…..something that didn’t use to occur in China, especially
>> for those on the reviewing stands, etc. I havent heard of him of him
>> in quite some time…had actually rather forgotten about him. But I
>> should tell you, I don’t keep up with the current comings and goings
>> in China to the extent I did when I had to work for a living.
>
> —
> Sean Noonan
> ADP- Tactical Intelligence
> Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
> Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
> http://www.stratfor.com
The following EMail is from 2009-09-14 and will give a view on China US and Uyghers. Also it shows you a short view on Stratfor thoughts about tibe a quote is following:
“This is really different than the Tibet issue in that Tibet is a
bullshit mountainous region, but has been a thorn in the
government’s side because of its large lobbying group abroad, not
because China wanted to integrate the region into China”
the way it was put to me (and tell me if I’m wrong Baker), but along with
those reasons below Beijing also wants to fold the xinjiang province more
economically into the greater Chinese econ, which is hard to do with such
hostility there.
It would shift xinjiang from being a buffer region to being another
stepping stone on their way to conquer CA.
Rodger Baker wrote:
Etim attacks two years ago, riots this year, greater worry about
national stability, want to avoid having xinjiang seen as tibet overseas
—
Wireless
————————————————————————–
From: Peter Zeihan
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2009 07:43:37 -0500
To: Jennifer Richmond
Subject: Re: [EastAsia] INSIGHT – US POV of Uyghers
why are the chinese thinking that this is something that now needs to be
treated differently? what’s changed from their pov?
Lauren Goodrich wrote:
LG: this one is kinda long, so I tried to divide it up.
Really interesting stuff on US view & Russian meddling
Can follow-up if you have questions Rodger or Jen.
CODE: KZ105
PUBLICATION: if needed
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Former State and USAID specialist on Uyghers
SOURCE LEVEL: medium
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 2
SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION: Analysts & EA & Eurasia
HANDLER: Lauren
China: basic shifts and feelings on Uyghers
China has shifted dramatically in how it looks at Xinxang. Before it
was just a bufferzone to be contained and suppressed. But now
Beijing wants to fully incorporate the region into China
economically, so it is more than just contained and suppressed
now…. Now they need real order and loyalty. Before they allowed an
independent streak in that as long as the Uighers didn’t act out
everything was okay, but now Beijing can’t risk even that.
This is really different than the Tibet issue in that Tibet is a
bullshit mountainous region, but has been a thorn in the
government’s side because of its large lobbying group abroad, not
because China wanted to integrate the region into China
further-Xingxiang is different because now Beijing wants to
integrate the region and it doesn’t have a large lobbying group.
—
Lauren Goodrich
Director of Analysis
Senior Eurasia Analyst
STRATFOR
T: 512.744.4311
F: 512.744.4334
lauren.goodrich@stratfor.com http://www.stratfor.com
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Well-connected guy in Indian policy, military,
financial circles
SOURCE Reliability : B
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 2
SPECIAL HANDLING: N/A
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
On a macro view – no these protests were not planned to be violent. Yes,
this year was a bit different – like a bubble which has been building up;
but also China’s global role vis a vis the Olympics played a role. To my 2
cents, there is no sign of India’s involvement – if you were to look,
India has been squirming to get an official reaction out. India does not
want any China-related issue to be raised – the government is too reticent
to bring any India-China issue away from the “dialogue”.
The following EMail gives you- a short view about the political situation in Tibet. It is about the Dalai Lama and his polical influence. The EMail is from – 2011-08-18 and will give you a short proof of the stratfor sources in china/tibet and some information about the situation in mid 2011.
**In response to our diary on Tibet (which he also praised).SOURCE: CN125
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Chinese activist and dissident
PUBLICATION: Yes, but see me first about wording
SOURCE RELIABILITY: B (so far)
ITEM CREDIBILITY: B/C he has biases but he’s within these circles so it
speaks to their concerns
SPECIAL HANDLING: Sent to secure because the source is sensitive, not
because the information is
SOURCE HANDLER: Jen
I would like to add one thought about one of difficulties facing the
Tibetans with the Dalai Lama fading out of politics. Lobsang Sanggay,
only a political leader, won’t allow the world’s leaders the flexibility
the Dalai Lama, both religious and political leader, did for them to
openly engage with him, for there is a single country on earth is
having formal diplomatic relationship with the Central Tibetan
Administration, aka, the Tibetan Government in exile. Would that mean
their international space would shrink as a result?
—
Jennifer Richmond
China Director
Director of International Projects
STRATFOR
w: 512-744-4105
c: 512-422-9335
richmond@stratfor.com http://www.stratfor.com
intelligenceleaks 