Cloud Computing in China Can Allways Be Intercepted By The Government

The following EMail will give you a view on chinese Internet SSL/TLS Security and cloud computing in china. The Source of this EMAil is an Stratfor called “Professional hacker” with an own “internet security company that consultswith companies globally including China”. Cloud Computing is one of the most common services providers deliver these days to their users/employees also for companies and agencys in china. but there is still a high risk in china if the websites are hosted in the country. It is way easy for the chinese government to intercept your SSL/TLS connection in china because they have root certificates in their browsers – “can still intercept and see SSL/TLS encrypted traffic because “Chinese
governments can still intercept and see SSL/TLS encrypted traffic because they have root certificates in the browser.” and there is nothing a private person or a company can do against this. The source claims that this is “especially true if they manage the infrastructure and don’t just provide hosting.”

you can see the whole EMail follows here:

INSIGHT – CHINA – Cloud Computing – CN64

Date 2011-02-15 20:51:29
From michael.wilson@stratfor.com
To analysts@stratfor.com
Others Listname: mailto:analysts@stratfor.com
MessageId:
InReplyTo: 4D5ACE22.2000406@stratfor.com

Text
**In response to what we just wrote on the CSM

SOURCE: CN64
ATTRIBUTION: Professional hacker
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Owns his own internet security company that consults
with companies globally including China
PUBLICATION: Yes
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 1
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SPECIAL HANDLING: None
SOURCE HANDLER: Jen

In concept this article is factually correct that it is possible (although
the word “clouds” is probably not ideal – “cloud network” is better).
Some might say things like “Well we only use SSL/TLS connections to the
machines, and we have XYZ security in place to prevent direct tampering.”
The problem is if the site is located within China, the Chinese
governments can still intercept and see SSL/TLS encrypted traffic because
they have root certificates in the browser. Once something is in the
physical hands of the enemy there is virtually nothing that the end
company can do. That is especially true if they manage the infrastructure
and don’t just provide hosting. Overall I think it’s a bad idea for
everyone but China. But I’m sure they’d say the same regarding the NSA’s
spying activities, https://www.eff.org/nsa/hepting So it’s a bit like the
pot calling the kettle black.


Jennifer Richmond
China Director
Director of International Projects
richmond@stratfor.com
(512) 744-4324
http://www.stratfor.com

Related Links:
http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1126742_insight-china-cloud-computing-cn64-.html

WikiLeaks Forum:
http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php/topic,17764.0.html

Background info on Chinese intelligence/political figures

The following EMail(s) are/is again is from a Former FBI FCI agent – it gives you a short view into the history of chinese intelligence work and the political figures behind and involved. the internal problems and the near future of chinese intelligence services. the EMail is dated -2010-03-05 17:17:18-

Re: INSIGHT-CHINA-Background info on Chinese intelligence/political figures
Date 2010-03-05 17:17:18

From burton@stratfor.com
To sean.noonan@stratfor.com
Others MessageId:
InReplyTo: 4B912E59.60409@stratfor.com

Text

Yes

Sean Noonan wrote:
> this was from IC Smith right? (collating all the insight and adding a
> few modification to the CI China piece right now)
>
> Fred Burton wrote:
>> Interesting historical perspective.
>>
>> Kang sounds like a ruthless SOB.
>> ————————————————————————
>> *From: * Korena Zucha
>> *Date: *Thu, 25 Feb 2010 17:06:03 -0600
>> *To: *’Secure List’
>> *Subject: *INSIGHT-CHINA-Background info on Chinese
>> intelligence/political figures
>>
>> SOURCE: US701
>> ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR security source
>> SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Former FBI FCI agent
>> PUBLICATION: if desired
>> SOURCE RELIABILITY: Still testing, relatively new source
>> ITEM CREDIBILITY: 2
>> DISTRIBUTION: Secure
>> SPECIAL HANDLING: None
>> SOURCE HANDLER: Fred
>>
>> One of the characteristics of Chinese politics and this applies to the
>> intelligence/security agencies as well, is that rank is not always a
>> firm indicator of importance and power. Remember, Deng Xiaoping never
>> succeeded either Chairman Mao or Premier Zhou, but he was
>> unquestionably the man in charge. It is clear that Kang retained
>> great power and there are those who think Li Kenong was essentially
>> his mouthpiece. I’m not completely sure that’s the case, but at any
>> rate, Kang continued to wield immense power, really up to his death in
>> 1975. But historically I think he falls in that rather gray area
>> where they would just as soon that he is forgotten, but no one has the
>> courage to pull the trigger. And this is, in my view, for two
>> reasons. He was simply brutal (I’ve often times said that never in
>> the history of conflict have the two opposing intelligence chiefs been
>> so completely sadistic as was Kang Sheng and Dai Li.) and given that
>> historical brutality (where he is said to have killed more of his
>> friends than his enemies) it is easy for Chinese today to really not
>> want to remember him. In many ways, I find Kang the single most
>> interesting character coming out of the Chinese Civil War.
>>
>> But also, there is Kang’s role starting the Cultural Revolutionl.
>> Note how the Chinese treat the Gang of Four for instance, relegating
>> them to memories trash can, except to further dump on them, but Kang,
>> (and Mao) have escaped such criticism, relatively speaking. Kang was
>> never threatened during the CR as was Deng and others…including even
>> some of the more prominent generals, i.e.He Long. But most of the
>> future leaders were indeed, treated harshly by the Red Guards (one of
>> Deng’s sons, Deng Pufeng, was thrown out of a window and is in a
>> wheelchair today) and when I chatted with my friend who was affiliated
>> with the MPS/MSS, even he didn’t really want to discuss Kang.
>>
>> I think Kang is one of the more intriguing characters in Chinese
>> history that hasn’t gotten the notoriety and attention he really
>> deserves, though such books as those by Byron and Pack (The Claws of
>> the Dragon) and Faligot and Kauffer (The Chinese Secret Service) are
>> good starts.
>>
>> But his completely sinister background (though he is said to have been
>> able to write calligraphy with both hands, at the same time!) and his
>> role in the CR are the reasons, I believe, he isn’t lionized as
>> perhaps others, i.e. Mao, Zhou Enlai, Deng, Zhe De (who was treated
>> harshly during the CR), He Long, etc. etc.
>>
>> Re Zhou Yangkang….I don’t really know the extent of his influence,
>> but I doubt its as powerful as Kang’s was at the height of his power.
>> Actually, I’m of the opinion that one of the reasons Deng Xiaoping
>> formed the MSS is that he didn’t trust the MPS, which was Kang’s
>> organization and had treated Deng himself badly during the CR. But I
>> have no real idea as to the extent of Zhou’s influence.
>>
>> And as for Jia, he too, seems to have dropped off the scope in many
>> ways. I don’t know if that’s by choice or by design on the part of
>> the ruling elite, but he seems to be in complete
>> retirement…..something that didn’t use to occur in China, especially
>> for those on the reviewing stands, etc. I havent heard of him of him
>> in quite some time…had actually rather forgotten about him. But I
>> should tell you, I don’t keep up with the current comings and goings
>> in China to the extent I did when I had to work for a living.
>
> —
> Sean Noonan
> ADP- Tactical Intelligence
> Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
> Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
> http://www.stratfor.com

Related Links
http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1655848_re-insight-china-background-info-on-chinese-intelligence.html

http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php/topic,17688.0.html

Chinese Intelligence

The following EMail gives you a view on the chinese intelligence. The Mail is from an Former FBI Senior Analyst that is in contact with stratfor on several EMails (you will find here) on chinese intelligence services and the work background. this EMail gives you a short view on the intelligence work and the primary attacks of chinese intelligence in the year 2010.

Re: INSIGHT: Chinese Intelligence

Date 2010-02-16 16:19:20
From colibasanu@stratfor.com
To watchofficer@stratfor.com
sean.noonan@stratfor.com
Others MessageId:
InReplyTo: 4B7AB3EB.6000806@stratfor.com
Text
what’s for secure@ should be sent directly there, not to WO, unless that’s
changed.

Sean Noonan wrote:

SOURCE:
ATTRIBUTION: Former Counterintelligence Officer
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Former FBI Senior Analyst
PUBLICATION: For Chinese intel piece, and background
SOURCE RELIABILITY:
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 2
DISTRIBUTION: Secure, Tactical
SPECIAL HANDLING: None
SOURCE HANDLER: Sean

That said, I have arrived at a few conclusions that probably are worth
thinking about. Here are several of them:
– When western intelligence analysts (myself included) make mistakes in
interpreting Chinese intelligence activities, it almost always is the
result of false assumptions. The most common assumption is that the
Chinese have/are/are going to do things the way the Soviets did. This
is not at all surprising, given that our entire intelligence structure,
including training, was built to meet and defeat a Soviet or
Soviet-trained threat; and the results of our analyses always had to be
presented to agency policymakers who relied almost exclusively on Soviet
points of reference. My favorite personal experience on this point was
that, at every reporting period, I had to identify how many K/S PRCIOs
were in the USA. While this was probably the key item in assessing the
current Soviet threat, in my area we never, ever saw any evidence to
suggest that the incidence of PRC intell activity in the USA varied with
the PRCIO presence level. Still, the Bureau’s management always assumed
that, if the PRC’s K/S stats were 10% of the Soviet stats, the Soviets
must be ten times the intell threat of the Chinese. Most cases I see or
hear about nowadays still suffer from critical mistakes based on acting
upon false assumptions from Day One of the case.
– It is a huge mistake to think that even a majority of the Chinese
intelligence activity we see –even clandestine activity against
classified targets– is attributable to the direction and control of the
PRCIS. I think the beat example in the public domain of this is the
ongoing Chinese attack against the nuclear weapons design and
engineering of the US national laboratories. In my opinion, the record
makes it quite plain that this campaign is directed and controlled by
the PRC’s Institute for Applied Physics & Computational Mathematics;
i.e., the IAPCM decides which lab employees will be approached, how &
when they will be be approached, and who on the PRC side will try to
establish a transitory or long-term intelligence relationship with the
US lab employee. Since it is well known that the IAPCM has close ties
with the Shanghai Bureau of the MSS, the normal interpretation is that
the employees of the IAPCM are coopted workers of the MSS. My view is
that the relationship is exactly the reverse: the IAPCM calls upon the
MSS for favors from time to time, but the MSS isn’t running the show. I
bring this example forward because, when it comes to plotting national
CI strategy, many people think it is necessary to penetrate the
MSS/Shanghai to find out important details of the attack against the
labs, but the better target would be the IAPCM. My current view is
about 70% of the PRC intell activity we see is not attributable to the
direction or control of the PRCIS.
– It is by no means clear what a “PRCIS case” is. For example, when the
offensive CI component concocts a sexual-entrapment op against a US
diplomat in Beijing, it certainly is clear to all that we are seeing the
MSS at it most dangerous. Likewise, when an MID/PLA officer in the USA
under military attache cover pays money to someone for sensitive
information, all can agree that we are seeing a PRC military
intelligence operation. When we run into cases where two employees of a
US defense contractor leave their company to form a new one and
subsequently are detected in China trying to sell stolen proprietary
information to a military research institute with close ties to the
MID/PLA, does the case change from economic espionage to an MID
operation? If the MID subsequently provides a tasking list, does it
then become an MID case? In my career, I saw many cases where there was
an important PRCIS link at some point, but the tradecraft evident in
collecting information, in transferring the information out of the USA,
and establishing and maintaining operational security almost always was
really weak. I often found myself wondering if the tradecraft I saw in
a given case was something made up by co-conspirator Zhang San or was
really PRCIS methodology. I was struck by how seldom the PRCIS took
control of a situation and imposed professional control over it
(actually, I didn’t ever see this even once); and eventually I concluded
that, whle it was well known that the PRCIS has good intelligence
manuals, it normally doesn’t follow them.
Hope this is food for thought for you.


Sean Noonan
ADP- Tactical Intelligence
Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
http://www.stratfor.com

Seconad Mail different start:

Re: INSIGHT: Chinese Intelligence
Date 2010-02-17 03:26:55
From chris.farnham@stratfor.com
To sean.noonan@stratfor.com
Others MessageId:
InReplyTo: 4B7AB3EB.6000806@stratfor.com
Text
The people who you most don’t want to read that, just did.
—– Original Message —–
From: “Sean Noonan”
To: watchofficer@stratfor.com
Sent: Tuesday, February 16, 2010 11:04:11 PM GMT +08:00 Beijing /
Chongqing / Hong Kong / Urumqi
Subject: INSIGHT: Chinese Intelligence

SOURCE:
ATTRIBUTION: Former Counterintelligence Officer
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Former FBI Senior Analyst
PUBLICATION: For Chinese intel piece, and background
SOURCE RELIABILITY:
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 2
DISTRIBUTION: Secure, Tactical
SPECIAL HANDLING: None
SOURCE HANDLER: Sean

(the mail now goes same as upon)

Related Links:
http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2013-02-24-00-insight-chinese-intelligence.html

WikiLeaks Forum

Chinas Jasmine Googlegroup organizer in contact with Stratfor Intelligence

This is way interessting inside view of stratfor contacts in china. the person (stratfor source) belongs to be the leader of one of the biggest jasmin revolution google groups and is/was in contact with stratfor intelligence agents via the demonstrations.Strfaor describes the Source as: ” Main person listed on the Jasmine google groups”

you can read the full EMail in the following lines.

MORE Re: INSIGHT- US/CHINA- Jasmine Googlegroup organizer on AP article

Date 2011-04-08 14:35:06
From sean.noonan@stratfor.com
To zhixing.zhang@stratfor.com
secure@stratfor.com
Others MessageId:
InReplyTo: 2107022585.1762098.1302201264693.JavaMail.root@core.stratfor.com

Text

*with coding this time.=C2= =A0=C2=A0 Still do not know how legit he is,
but he is willing to talk through the whole story of their
development.=C2=A0 this could become= a very good ongoing conversation,
and I will have to be careful with this analysis we are putting out
now.=C2=A0 ZZ, please take a look at the edit version and doublecheck my
bias towards his ‘majority in china’ argument [which I don’t believe].

SOURCE: CN507
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Main person listed on the Jasmine google
groups.=C2=A0=C2=A0
PUBLICATION: As needed.=C2=A0= =C2=A0
SOURCE RELIABILITY: C [still trying to feel this out]
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
SPECIAL HANDLING: none=C2=A0
SOURCE HANDLER: Sean

Yes, I am involved in “the Initiators” group at certain degree, though I
believe the word “the Initiators” is some kind of misleading, since no one
in this group really involved the organizing of the first gathering. I am
not involved in Hong Kong group. Recently, my role has been shifted to
coordinator to liaison between groups. I have connects to all groups
except one, which also calls themselves initiators. Based on very limit
information, I believe this group’s majority members located in China.

We indeed do have some kind of coordinate problem. Too many people want to
be in leading position. So far, at lease three groups have active members
in China. So the question is not the coordination but the communication,
how to let more people in China know there is such movement.

On 4/7/11 1:34 PM, Sean Noonan wrote:

This is all he said on the article below:

This group is one of the two largest currently. I reckon it ranks
second. The other one bases on Hong Kong.

———————————————————————-

From: “Michael Wilson”
To: “The OS List”
Sent: Wednesday, April 6, 2011 7:09:42 AM
Subject: [OS] CHINA/US/CSM – AP Exclusive: Group in China protest
calls=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= emerges

AP Exclusive: Group in China protest calls emerges
AP
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110406/ap_on_re_as=
/as_china_jasmine_revealed;_ylt=3DAnh.nz1_n.j8ZGquz8f2vQhvaA8F;_ylu=3DX3oDM=
TJ1am9zZWw3BGFzc2V0A2FwLzIwMTEwNDA2L2FzX2NoaW5hX2phc21pbmVfcmV2ZWFsZWQEcG9z=
AzYEc2VjA3luX2FydGljbGVfc3VtbWFyeV9saXN0BHNsawNhcGV4Y2x1c2l2ZWc-
By GILLIAN WONG, Associated Press Gillian Wong, Associated Press
=E2=80=93 1 hr 40 mins ago

SEOUL, South Korea =E2=80=93 Strolling past hip cafes, the young Ch=
inese man in a white sports jacket and faded jeans looks like any other
university student in the South Korean capital. But the laptop in his
black backpack is a tool in a would-be revolution in China.

The 22-year-old computer science student is part of a group behind
appeals that started popping up anonymously on the Internet seven weeks
ago calling on Chinese to stage peaceful protests to get the ruling
Communist Party to move toward democracy. Those calls have spooked the
government into launching one of its broadest campaigns of repression in
years to keep the protests from catching on, as they have in the Middle
East and North Africa.

The Associated Press tracked down the student and some of his
colleagues, giving an exclusive first look at one group of campaigners
behind the online petitions, where they are based and how they use
technology to operate behind the anonymity of the Internet.

Their group, they said, is a network of 20 mostly highly educated, young
Chinese with eight members inside China and 12 in more than half a dozen
other countries.

Calling itself “The Initiators and Organizers of the Chinese Jasmine
Revolution” after a phrase used in the Tunisian uprising, the group is
not the sole source of the protest calls; at least four others have
sprung up. “The Initiators” group appears well-organized, with members
tasked to recruit, manage social networking sites and gather feedback.

Interviews with four members show similar evolutions: They grew to
resent the government’s autocratic rule and China’s widespread
inequality and injustice. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt made change
look possible.

“People born in the late ’80s and the ’90s have basically decided that
in their generation one-party rule cannot possibly outlive them, cannot
possibly even continue in their lifetimes. This is for certain,” the
lean, soft-spoken 22-year-old who goes by the Internet alias “Forest
Intelligence” told The AP in an interview Sunday at a cafe in Seoul’s
trendy Samcheong-dong district.

While the calls for weekly demonstrations every Sunday in dozens of
cities have attracted many onlookers and few outright protesters, their
impact is clear. The government has responded with more police on the
streets, more intrusive Internet monitoring and the detention,
disappearance or arrest of more than 200 people. Artist and government
critic Ai Weiwei seems to be the latest, taken into custody over the
weekend. The group said none of those detained have been involved with
their protest calls.

Members of the group requested anonymity out of concern that they or
their families might be targeted for retribution by the government,
which maintains an extensive network of informants among student groups
overseas. Most members know each other only by Internet nicknames.

They also are concerned that, with more than half their members outside
China, their movement might be seen as a foreign-backed, anti-China plot
rather than a response to real domestic problems.

“The revolution was started purely because of the failure of domestic
affairs, not because of overseas forces,” said “Hua Ge,” a Columbia
University graduate in classics who lives in New York and at 27 years
old is one of the group’s older members. He recruited the others.

The first online calls for a Chinese “Jasmine Revolution” =E2=80=94= a
Twitter post on Feb. 17 and a longer appeal on the U.S.-based Chinese
news site Boxun.com on Feb. 19 =E2=80=94 remain anonymous. = Soon after
they appeared, Hua Ge said that he, together with a man in China that he
refused to identify, started the website Molihuaxingdong.blogspot.com.

“Molihuaxingdong” is Chinese for “Jasmine Movement” and it has evolved
to include a Facebook page, a Twitter feed, and Google groups for every
Chinese province or territory. Many of the sites are blocked in China,
but remain effective because so many Chinese know how to elude
government blocks, said Hua Ge.

“People need to have some change in their thinking,” said Hua Ge, a
native of the central Chinese city of Wuhan. “They don’t really
understand what rights they have, or what kind of political future they
can choose.”

Their main Google group has more than online 1,200 users, though how
many are inside China is unclear. An online survey posted in February
received 300 responses, mostly from people in China, members said, and
the group gets 50 to 100 emails daily from participants in the country.

Outside China, members are in France, Australia, Canada, Korea and
Japan, among other countries. “Forest Intelligence” oversees the
recruitment of volunteers and maintains the website. “Xiaomo,” a
24-year-old college student in Paris, collates comments from surveys.
Boston-based student “Pamela Wang,” 18, translates news articles into
Chinese and is one of eight administrators of the group’s Facebook page.

The eight members in China include an expert in online search engines, a
former government employee who writes articles and someone who works on
the website’s layout, said Hua Ge. He refused to provide their contact
information or reveal details about them out of concerns for their
safety.

Hua Ge said the group also has consulted Wang Juntao, a prominent
dissident sentenced to 13 years in prison for advising students during
the 1989 pro-democracy protests centered on Tiananmen Square. Freed on
medical parole in 1993, Wang now lives in New York and confirmed his
assistance.

Collectively, the group’s postings are often clever with a touch of
sarcasm. People are urged to “stroll” and “smile” rather than protest.
“We are making a new history of revolution by a unique way: We use the
sound of laughter, singing and salutations instead of the sound of guns,
cannons and warplanes!” a notice dated March 1 said.

Online security is a major concern, and group members are constantly in
touch. On Sunday, Forest Intelligence showed an AP reporter his laptop,
on which was installed a virtual machine =E2= =80=94 an operating system
within the computer’s normal operating system that provides an extra
layer of protection against hackers.

As soon as he logged on, Skype and Gmails chat services blinked with new
messages. “Are you back yet?” wrote Xiaomo, who then relayed news that
activist-artist Ai Weiwei was prevented from getting on a flight to Hong
Kong. Less than an hour later, the news was posted on the group’s
website.

On Tuesday, the group released an Internet safety manual to help Chinese
users circumvent censors and issued another statement deploring the
current crackdown. It warned that if activists were not released by
April 10, they would retaliate by using “search engine optimization”
techniques so that when Chinese do online searches for names of
officials the results will link to reports about corruption.

The group has no illusions that change, if any, will come soon, but is
willing to wait years to gather momentum.

“Some people say this movement is going to die and this movement is not
going to be successful like that in Tunisia or Egypt, but in those
countries, it took three or four years for the people to make
preparations and finally, there was a peaceful transition,” Hua Ge said.
“It may take a period of time for the people to wake up, so the longer
we continue our efforts the more people will know about the situation
and join us.”
Follow Yahoo! News on Twitter, become a fan on Facebook

–=20
Michael Wilson
Senior Watch Officer, STRATFOR
Office: (512) 744 4300 ex. 4112
Email: michael.wilson@st=
ratfor.com


Sean Noonan
Tactical Analyst
Office: +1 512-279-9479
Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
http://www.stratfor.com

Sean Noonan

Tactical Analyst

Office: +1 512-279-9479

Mobile: +1 512-758-5967

Strategic Forecasting, Inc.

http://www.stratfor.com

http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2013-02-24-00-chinas-jasmine-googlegroup-organizer-in.html

The WikiLeaks Forum
http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php/topic,17682.0.html

INSIGHT – CHINA – Tibet’s shrinking international space?

The following EMail gives you- a short view about the political situation in Tibet. It is about the Dalai Lama and his polical influence. The EMail is from – 2011-08-18 and will give you a short proof of the stratfor sources in china/tibet and some information about the situation in mid 2011.

http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php/topic,17658.0.html

INSIGHT – CHINA – Tibet’s shrinking international space? – CN125

Date 2011-08-18 05:37:25
From richmond@stratfor.com
To secure@stratfor.com
Others InReplyTo: 1205890562-1313634578-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-642315802-@b27.c2.bise6.blackberry
Text
**In response to our diary on Tibet (which he also praised).SOURCE: CN125
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Chinese activist and dissident
PUBLICATION: Yes, but see me first about wording
SOURCE RELIABILITY: B (so far)
ITEM CREDIBILITY: B/C he has biases but he’s within these circles so it
speaks to their concerns
SPECIAL HANDLING: Sent to secure because the source is sensitive, not
because the information is
SOURCE HANDLER: Jen

I would like to add one thought about one of difficulties facing the
Tibetans with the Dalai Lama fading out of politics. Lobsang Sanggay,
only a political leader, won’t allow the world’s leaders the flexibility
the Dalai Lama, both religious and political leader, did for them to
openly engage with him, for there is a single country on earth is
having formal diplomatic relationship with the Central Tibetan
Administration, aka, the Tibetan Government in exile. Would that mean
their international space would shrink as a result?


Jennifer Richmond
China Director
Director of International Projects
STRATFOR
w: 512-744-4105
c: 512-422-9335
richmond@stratfor.com
http://www.stratfor.com