THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH: A CLOSER LOOK

This Text is from a Stratfor INSIGHT PDF or DocX Document it is about the Assasination of OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH.

The assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh (Arabic: محمود المبحوح‎, Maḥmūd al-Mabḥūḥ) (14 February 1961 – 19 January 2010) took place on 19 January 2010, in a Dubai hotel room. Al-Mabhouh—a co-founder of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the IslamistPalestinian group Hamas—was wanted by the Israeli government for the kidnapping and murder of two Israeli soldiers in 1989 as well as purchasing arms from Iran for use in Gaza; these have been cited as a possible motive for the assassination.^[1] He also had many other enemies including Fatah (whose members “loathed” him), Egypt had imprisoned him for all of 2003, and Jordan’s intelligence services were looking for him.^[2]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Mahmoud_Al-Mabhouh

This was an Mossad Israelian Operation behind own lines on the field of Dubai. This Insight will give a view more details on that actions also you will find WikiLeaks Related Cables of this Story right here:

http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10ABUDHABI103&q=al-mabhouh%20mahmoud

http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=10DUBAI29&q=al-mabhouh%20mahmoud

The Following text is a copie from a Stratfor Intelligence Document and will give you another insight view of the Assasination.

THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH: A CLOSER LOOK

Editor’s Note: This intelligence brief is based on information and insight that STRATFOR analysts believe would be of interest to our clients and aid them in their security planning.

Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was found dead Jan. 20 in his room at Al-Bustan hotel in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Al-Mabhouh was a senior Hamas military commander and one of the founders of the Izz al-Deen al-Qassam Brigades. He was traveling to Dubai for an unknown meeting, presumably on sensitive Hamas business. According to STRATFOR sources, he had stopped in Dubai on his way to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials about prospective arms sales to Hamas. Al-Mabhouh was traveling without security. According to one report, this was due to the inability to purchase airfare for his bodyguards, though we suspect there might have been an operational reason for him to travel alone.

Dubai law enforcement authorities have ruled out natural causes in al-Mabhouh’s death and have identified as many as 17 individuals (15 men and two women) believed to have participated in the assassination on Jan. 19. Dubai law enforcement officials were able to track 11 of the 17 individuals through closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage back to their arrival at the Dubai International Airport 19 hours before the hit. The 11 individuals traveled to Dubai on passports from Ireland, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. They arrived at different times from different locations around Europe approximately 14 hours before al-Mabhouh arrived. The team also used several different high-pedestrian-traffic locations throughout Dubai — including at least three hotels and a shopping center — as meeting locations, logistics hubs and staging sites prior to the assassination.

Additionally, Dubai law enforcement officials were able to identify several reportedly encrypted international phone calls made from the phones of the suspected members of the assassination team to numbers in Austria, where Dubai authorities suspect a command and control center for the operation was based. The members of the teams had attempted to alter their physical appearance to varying degrees, from simply wearing a hat to donning wigs and glasses. Furthermore, the demeanor of the team members viewed in the CCTV footage did not deviate from that of any ordinary tourist or businessman who frequents Dubai, which indicates a high level of experience and professionalism.

Throughout the CCTV footage, it is very clear that the 17 members of the teams carried out specific roles in the operation. At least four surveillance teams were identified; three of the four teams appeared to work in pairs, while it seemed the fourth “team” consisted of a single individual. Another individual, who appeared to be the senior commander of the operation, apparently reserved the room across the hall from where al-Mabhouh was staying. The remaining seven members of the group appeared to serve as lookouts outside al-Mabhouh’s room and as the actual assassins.

The Operation Under Way

Prior to al-Mabhouh’s arrival in Dubai, the surveillance teams were positioned at the airport and at two hotels that al-Mabhouh was known to frequent when he traveled to Dubai. Once he arrived at Al-Bustan, two surveillance operatives located in the lobby were seen following him to his room. Once his room number had been confirmed, the two surveillants contacted the rest of the team, who then moved to Al-Bustan, where the hotel room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s was reserved by the senior commander. Al-Mabhouh then left Al-Bustan for a meeting with an unknown individual. CCTV footage shows one of the surveillance operatives watching al-Mabhouh get into a vehicle and then apparently describing the vehicle to others via cell phone.

After al-Mabhouh’s departure, two men and a woman, wearing wigs and glasses, and two two-man assassin teams staged themselves in the room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s room. Upon his return to Al-Bustan, al-Mabhouh is seen passing a disguised man and woman, who take up lookout positions near the elevator and outside al-Mabhouh’s room. Al-Mabhouh is intercepted and killed in his room by the two assassin teams. The surveillance teams then leave the premises, followed by the assassin teams and finally by the disguised team members. The 11 identified individuals flew out of Dubai International Airport between two and 10 hours after the assassination to different locations — such as South Africa, Hong Kong, Germany, France and Switzerland — long before a hotel cleaning crew discovered al-Mabhouh’s body at approximately 1:30 p.m. local time on Jan. 20.

The arrival of the team members 19 hours ahead of the operation and 14 hours ahead of al-Mabhouh indicates that the group or organization had prior knowledge of al-Mabhouh’s travel plans. Additionally, the coordinated movements and logistics involved in the operation typically require an advance team in place ahead of the assassination team’s arrival. Throughout the CCTV footage, some members of the team, specifically the actual assassins, seemed mindful of the surveillance cameras and moved in such a way as to block a direct view of their faces, while others were not as careful.

The team’s movements throughout the operation were methodical, calculated and well-choreographed. Their outward demeanor immediately before and after the killing was smooth and did not deviate from that of regular Dubai visitors. The tactics, tradecraft and logistics involved in this operation were well beyond the capabilities of known terror organizations and all but a few national intelligence services. While the CCTV footage does not offer any clues as to who carried out the assassination, is does display a high and rare degree of professionalism.

Protection Concerns

While al-Mabhouh was clearly engaged in questionable activities that made him a target for assassination, there are valuable lessons that can be learned from studying the tactics and tradecraft used in this operation as outlined in the videos found at these links:
(Part 1)

(Part 2)

(Part 3)

Many executive protection (EP) teams spend a great deal of time with their principals in foreign four- and five-star hotels similar to Al-Bustan. While these hotels offer a significantly higher level of security than some other venues, the assassination of al¬Mabouh is a clear example that there can be security risks inside the confines of even a high-end hotel.

Hotels are considered by many security teams to be relatively safe environments, and in a typical EP hotel scenario, designated members of the team, usually one close-protection agent (though occasionally two agents are used), escort the principal to and from his or her room. In some cases, the principal may even move around the hotel to use the gym, eat or attend meetings without his protection team.

The number of attackers involved in the assassination of al-Mabhouh could easily have overpowered one or two close-protection agents, especially if the assassins were able to achieve the element of surprise and were skilled fighters or used weapons. Furthermore, in such a scenario, the close-protection agent(s) would likely be targeted first, to remove the danger they pose before focusing on the principal.

The skill and degree of surveillance exhibited in the al-Mabhouh assassination would have been difficult for an EP team or targeted principal to detect and defend against. It is very difficult for EP agents to focus much attention on surveillance detection, especially in the case of a one- or two-man team. This underscores the need for a comprehensive and professionally trained countersurveillance (CS) team in such situations. The CS team focuses on the events and actors surrounding the principal and the EP detail, and by its very nature is in a far better position to detect hostile surveillance than close-protection agents are.

The surveillance of al-Mabhouh observed on the CCTV footage would likely have been picked up by a deployed CS team. The CS team could then have alerted the EP team to possible threats and allowed the EP team to increase the level of protection and/or notify the appropriate authorities. The very presence of a CS team could also serve to raise the risk of conducting such an operation to the point where another target would be selected.

The al-Mabhouh case also demonstrates the importance of EP teams keeping tabs on the individuals who occupy the hotel rooms in close proximity to their principals. Such rooms can be used as ambush sites when the principal walks through the hall, and in some cases, they can be used to gain entry to the principal’s room through adjoining doorways or from the exterior of the building.

Click to access 24875_DUBAI_brief_100219.pdf

http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php?topic=17438.0

####

DUBAI brief final doc & pdf
Date    2010-02-19 19:29:54
From    mccullar@stratfor.com
To    alfano@stratfor.com
scott.stewart@stratfor.com
alex.posey@stratfor.com
Others    InReplyTo: 6670C261-657D-4B3E-AE15-88655672F734@stratfor.com
Attachments

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Text
Here ya go.
—
Michael McCullar
Senior Editor, Special Projects
STRATFOR
E-mail: mccullar@stratfor.com
Tel: 512.744.4307
Cell: 512.970.5425
Fax: 512.744.4334

http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2013-02-10-00-dubai-brief-final-doc-and-pdf.html

 

AFGHANISTAN´s private War – Investment by Blackwater and Others Private Security Contractors – 1.5 Billion Dollar

The next EMail gives you a view on Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and the fincanially invovement of 1.5 Billion Dollar of this private security companys. the involvement has deep ties into the financial sectors – and it shows you clearly that war is money. the mail gives you also a view on who maybe is responsible in 2014 if the western army troops will leave the country completely.

INSIGHT – AFGHANISTAN – Private Security Contractors – AF3

Date 2010-10-27 15:04:22
From colibasanu@stratfor.com
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Text

CODE: AF3
PUBLICATION: Analysis
DESCRIPTION: Senior correspondent for Reuters in Kabul, an Afghan national
ATTRIBUTION: Not Applicable
SOURCE RELIABILITY: A
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
SPECIAL HANDLING: Not Applicable
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
HANDLER: Kamran

Although under pressure from Washington to soften the decree and issue a
new joint ruling on the firms, Kabul is still defiant.
It has already seized hundreds of arms from smaller groups run by Afghan
companies as part of the process supposed to be completed by the end of
the year. those firms have closed now.
Those guarding compounds, companies, embassies and escorting
diplomats will be exempted from Karzai’s order.
There have been some bloody incidents by some members of the firms,
especially in the south in recent years.
The firms are not accountable to Kabul and in the face of the incidents
and with the ambitious plan for taking all security responsibilities by
2014, Karzai is keen to get this done.
Blackwater and few others run by some western officials are obviously not
happy because some 1.5 billion dollars are involved in the industry.
Hillary clinton rang Karzai on Saturday and the next day Karzai said he
would implement the ban and the following day we had new york times
talking how Karzai was getting cash in bags from Iran.
Also, Karzai a while back in a statement said the deadline for disbanding
the security firms will be extended until mid Feb.

Related Links:
http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/1806816_insight-afghanistan-private-security-contractors-af3-.html

WikiLeaks Forum:
http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php/topic,17691.0.html

INSIGHT – SYRIA/IRAN – Can Iran counter Syria/Saudi plans for HZ?

The following Stratfor EMail is from 2010-08-26 00:05:54 and gives you a point of view on the Iranian / Syrian and Saudi Relations and problems in 2010.

 

Date 2010-08-26 00:05:54
From bokhari@stratfor.com
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Text

Geography (as opposed to demography) explains why Iraq is a much bigger
priority for Iran than Lebanon. From the Iranian pov, they can’t achieve
much more than what they have already in Lebanon because they are
dependent upon Syrian cooperation which is waning. And because of the
Saudi moves. Rather the ones from the Turks, whom the Iranians don’t want
to irk. From the Iranians pov, Lebanon is a key outpost of Iranian
influence but with limited value. They have to compete with the Syrians,
Saudis, and Turks. Not to mention the Israelis. Ideally, the IRI after it
was established would have liked to focus on Iraq as opposed to Lebanon
but it couldn’t because of the Baathist regime there and the war it
imposed on the Iranians. In contrast, the ’82 Israeli invasion of Lebanon
provided the Iranians with an opening. They had help from the Syrians who
at the time were enemies of the Iraqis, had the Israeli threat, which was
magnified because of the Turkish-Israeli alignment, and were also seen as
a pariah in the Arab world because of the Alawite nature of the regime.
So, Damascus sought alignment with Iran. Now that the regional dynamics
have shifted, the Syrians are in the process of putting some distance
between themselves and the Iranians, Tehran sees that it may not be able
to manage its Lebanese asset as it used to though it needs it to keep the
Israelis from attacking them. This is why Iran despite seeing Iraq as the
priority will not yield on Hezbollah without a fight. In the end, what
will happen is that Hezbollah’s status as the premier non-state Iranian
proxy will be reduced several notches down to where it will be a
pro-Iranian political force in Lebanon. For the Saudis and the Arabs, if
they can achieve this then they would have compensated for the loss of
Iraq. For them the Iranian threat becomes much more manageable as long as
they don’t have to worry about the Iranians being in their front and
backyard.
Link: themeData
Link: colorSchemeMapping
On 8/25/2010 5:49 PM, Reva Bhalla wrote:

er, sorry. that should say Syria edging away from Iran* below
On Aug 25, 2010, at 4:47 PM, Reva Bhalla wrote:

the first report really interested me because in considering who the
source is, who I think likes to channel information to the admin
through us, Iran may be trying to signal that they’re not worried
about what the US/Saudi/Turkey are doing with Syria and HZ — that’s
not what is going to compel them to negotiate. Their focus is on Iraq,
and they know they have the upper hand there. THen, think about the
serial bombings today…
On Aug 25, 2010, at 4:44 PM, Reginald Thompson wrote:

3 different reports from 3 different sources on Syria edging away
from Iran and revising the rules for Hezbollah. The first 2 are of
particular interest.
PUBLICATION: analysis/background
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Iranian diplomat
SOURCE Reliability : D
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
The US is definitely luring Syria to distance itself from Iran, and
is using Iraq as the incentive. With the major redeployment of US
troops in Iraq,in preparation for their withdrawal within a year,
the US is suggesting that Syria fills in the gap and dilute Shiite
fixation on Iran. The Saudis who worked hard to reinstate Syrian
influence in Lebanon are in the process of convincing the US that
Syria can be an asset in Iraq.
The Iranians do not prefer to resort to violence in dealing with
Syria. The source agrees that Tehran has the option of using Sunni
militants against the regime in Damascus. He adds that Iran
realizes, however, that Sunni militants cannot topple the regime in
Damascus. As he puts it, the militants’ impact on the Syrian regime
is not any more significant than that of the Katuyshas on Israel’s
security. Iran has the capacity to blunt Syrian initiatives in Iraq
without making too much noise. He says Iraq is secure in Iranian
hands. He admits, however, that HZ in Lebanon would be the casualty.
He notes that Iraq is much more important for Iran than the status
of HZ in Lebanon. He does not belittle the significance of HZ for
Iranian regional policy. He notes, nevertheless, that a major aim of
Iran’s regional policy is control of Iraq.Making compromises on HZ
in Lebanon may be a price that Iran has to pay for maintaining its
hold on Iraq. He says the Shiites in Lebanon do not constitute a
majority and that their current influence in Lebanon is tenuous and
depends on regional developments. Iraq is a different matter and
Iranian interests there are strategic. He says that Iran will by no
means sacrifice HZ without putting a fight. He says it is still
premature to speculate. He concludes saying that Iran’s greatest
asset in Syria is that Israel is not interested in peace with
Damascus. The Syrians know it and this is why they are not yet ready
to burn bridges with Tehran.
PUBLICATION: analysis/background
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Current advisor to Bashar al Assad, used to
advise Hafiz
SOURCE Reliability : D
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva
Syria has finally got Hizbullah by the neck. He admits that HZ has
the capacity for sabotage in Syria. They have established strong
connections with many Iraqi Shiites currently living in Syria and
have actually set up many sleeping cells in the country, but
especially in Greater Damascus. They have very limited contacts with
Sunni militants because the Syrians are in full charge of the
borders with Iraq. Sunnis in al-Jazeera region in Syria, which is
contiguous with al-Anbar province in Iraq, are aversive to Shiites
and do not welcome al-Qaeda militants. They were staunchly
pro-Saddam Hussein and are on good terms with the Iraqi Ba’th Party.

It will be difficult for the Iranians to send to Syria al-Qaeda
militants since the security forces there know their infiltration
routes and likely contacts in the country. He says Sunni militants
cannot topple the regime in Damascus. The regime’s policy in dealing
with them is harsh and employs the “flattening” concept. By this he
refers to the policy of the late Hafiz Asad in dealing with the
Brotherhood’s insurgency in Hama in 1982.

Syria has no plan on taking on HZ in Lebanon as long as it does not
violate the existing rules of the game as they have been revised by
Syria, i.e., no takeover of Beirut. He says Syria knows how to keep
HZ bogged down in Lebanon and how to preoccupy it with petty
security concerns. He says what happened in Beirut last night is an
example of what Syria can do to HZ. He agrees that the clash between
HZ and al-Ahbash started over a personal matter, but Syrian agents
immediately took advantage of the situation and widened the scope of
the conflict.HZ knows that they are under strict orders to avoid
overrunning Beirut. He says Syria can easily repeat on a regular
basis last night’s incident. It takes no effort to start a fight
over a personal matter. As the source says: “the Lebanese have
strong egos. They are always eager to pull the trigger.” He says HZ
does not want to be drawn into routine skirmishes in the alleys of
Beirut because that would discredit it even among its own Shiite
partisans. Syria will tame HZ into submission.
PUBLICATION: analysis/background
ATTRIBUTION: STRATFOR source
SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Turkish diplomat
SOURCE Reliability : C
ITEM CREDIBILITY: 3
DISTRIBUTION: Analysts
SOURCE HANDLER: Reva

Turkey will not allow Iran/HZ to destabilize the Asad regime. The
only group in Syria that has the potential to challenge the regime
is the Brotherhood.Turkey has great influence on the Brotherhood,
especially after it hosted its most recent congress in Istanbul,
which led to the rise to power of the radical Hama faction within
the movement. He says the new Brotherhood leadership will never take
aim at the Asad regime without Turkish authorization. He adds that
subversive acts against the Asad regime by other militant groups
will not amount to much. The Iranians know that the stability of the
Asad regime is a red line and that Turkey will not tolerate any
attempt to undermine it. Turkey has won over Hamas in Gaza. The
process of cornering Iran has begun, even though Turkey does not
have ill feelings, or sinister motives towards Iran.

WikiLeaks

http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2013-02-21-00-insight-syria-iran-can-iran-counter-syria.html

WikiLeaks Forum

http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php/topic,17642.0.html