Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari was sentenced to life in prison for attempting to build a bomb. He never build a bomb. He came to the US in 2008 to study chemical engineering. He had plans and he owned chemicals but he never attacked anyone anyway he faces now a life in prison.
In this Document you will see that the FBI Agent is clearly telling that he THINKS Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari is going to build a weapon of mass destruction as evidence his research of instructions, the research of potential targets, purchasing the material of chemicals and the needed ingredients are enough evidences for a person to sent him his whole life to prison.
Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari has been accused for a crime until today he has not done.
This is a part of his story.
(right click on a picture to show it in full screen mode)
This Text is from a Stratfor INSIGHT PDF or DocX Document it is about the Assasination of OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH.
The assassination of Mahmoud Al-Mabhouh (Arabic: محمود المبحوح, Maḥmūd al-Mabḥūḥ) (14 February 1961 – 19 January 2010) took place on 19 January 2010, in a Dubai hotel room. Al-Mabhouh—a co-founder of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the IslamistPalestinian group Hamas—was wanted by the Israeli government for the kidnapping and murder of two Israeli soldiers in 1989 as well as purchasing arms from Iran for use in Gaza; these have been cited as a possible motive for the assassination.[1] He also had many other enemies including Fatah (whose members “loathed” him), Egypt had imprisoned him for all of 2003, and Jordan’s intelligence services were looking for him.[2]
This was an Mossad Israelian Operation behind own lines on the field of Dubai. This Insight will give a view more details on that actions also you will find WikiLeaks Related Cables of this Story right here:
The Following text is a copie from a Stratfor Intelligence Document and will give you another insight view of the Assasination.
THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHMOUD AL-MABHOUH: A CLOSER LOOK
Editor’s Note: This intelligence brief is based on information and insight that STRATFOR analysts believe would be of interest to our clients and aid them in their security planning.
Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was found dead Jan. 20 in his room at Al-Bustan hotel in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Al-Mabhouh was a senior Hamas military commander and one of the founders of the Izz al-Deen al-Qassam Brigades. He was traveling to Dubai for an unknown meeting, presumably on sensitive Hamas business. According to STRATFOR sources, he had stopped in Dubai on his way to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials about prospective arms sales to Hamas. Al-Mabhouh was traveling without security. According to one report, this was due to the inability to purchase airfare for his bodyguards, though we suspect there might have been an operational reason for him to travel alone.
Dubai law enforcement authorities have ruled out natural causes in al-Mabhouh’s death and have identified as many as 17 individuals (15 men and two women) believed to have participated in the assassination on Jan. 19. Dubai law enforcement officials were able to track 11 of the 17 individuals through closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage back to their arrival at the Dubai International Airport 19 hours before the hit. The 11 individuals traveled to Dubai on passports from Ireland, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. They arrived at different times from different locations around Europe approximately 14 hours before al-Mabhouh arrived. The team also used several different high-pedestrian-traffic locations throughout Dubai — including at least three hotels and a shopping center — as meeting locations, logistics hubs and staging sites prior to the assassination.
Additionally, Dubai law enforcement officials were able to identify several reportedly encrypted international phone calls made from the phones of the suspected members of the assassination team to numbers in Austria, where Dubai authorities suspect a command and control center for the operation was based. The members of the teams had attempted to alter their physical appearance to varying degrees, from simply wearing a hat to donning wigs and glasses. Furthermore, the demeanor of the team members viewed in the CCTV footage did not deviate from that of any ordinary tourist or businessman who frequents Dubai, which indicates a high level of experience and professionalism.
Throughout the CCTV footage, it is very clear that the 17 members of the teams carried out specific roles in the operation. At least four surveillance teams were identified; three of the four teams appeared to work in pairs, while it seemed the fourth “team” consisted of a single individual. Another individual, who appeared to be the senior commander of the operation, apparently reserved the room across the hall from where al-Mabhouh was staying. The remaining seven members of the group appeared to serve as lookouts outside al-Mabhouh’s room and as the actual assassins.
The Operation Under Way
Prior to al-Mabhouh’s arrival in Dubai, the surveillance teams were positioned at the airport and at two hotels that al-Mabhouh was known to frequent when he traveled to Dubai. Once he arrived at Al-Bustan, two surveillance operatives located in the lobby were seen following him to his room. Once his room number had been confirmed, the two surveillants contacted the rest of the team, who then moved to Al-Bustan, where the hotel room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s was reserved by the senior commander. Al-Mabhouh then left Al-Bustan for a meeting with an unknown individual. CCTV footage shows one of the surveillance operatives watching al-Mabhouh get into a vehicle and then apparently describing the vehicle to others via cell phone.
After al-Mabhouh’s departure, two men and a woman, wearing wigs and glasses, and two two-man assassin teams staged themselves in the room across the hall from al-Mabhouh’s room. Upon his return to Al-Bustan, al-Mabhouh is seen passing a disguised man and woman, who take up lookout positions near the elevator and outside al-Mabhouh’s room. Al-Mabhouh is intercepted and killed in his room by the two assassin teams. The surveillance teams then leave the premises, followed by the assassin teams and finally by the disguised team members. The 11 identified individuals flew out of Dubai International Airport between two and 10 hours after the assassination to different locations — such as South Africa, Hong Kong, Germany, France and Switzerland — long before a hotel cleaning crew discovered al-Mabhouh’s body at approximately 1:30 p.m. local time on Jan. 20.
The arrival of the team members 19 hours ahead of the operation and 14 hours ahead of al-Mabhouh indicates that the group or organization had prior knowledge of al-Mabhouh’s travel plans. Additionally, the coordinated movements and logistics involved in the operation typically require an advance team in place ahead of the assassination team’s arrival. Throughout the CCTV footage, some members of the team, specifically the actual assassins, seemed mindful of the surveillance cameras and moved in such a way as to block a direct view of their faces, while others were not as careful.
The team’s movements throughout the operation were methodical, calculated and well-choreographed. Their outward demeanor immediately before and after the killing was smooth and did not deviate from that of regular Dubai visitors. The tactics, tradecraft and logistics involved in this operation were well beyond the capabilities of known terror organizations and all but a few national intelligence services. While the CCTV footage does not offer any clues as to who carried out the assassination, is does display a high and rare degree of professionalism.
Protection Concerns
While al-Mabhouh was clearly engaged in questionable activities that made him a target for assassination, there are valuable lessons that can be learned from studying the tactics and tradecraft used in this operation as outlined in the videos found at these links:
(Part 1)
(Part 2)
(Part 3)
Many executive protection (EP) teams spend a great deal of time with their principals in foreign four- and five-star hotels similar to Al-Bustan. While these hotels offer a significantly higher level of security than some other venues, the assassination of al¬Mabouh is a clear example that there can be security risks inside the confines of even a high-end hotel.
Hotels are considered by many security teams to be relatively safe environments, and in a typical EP hotel scenario, designated members of the team, usually one close-protection agent (though occasionally two agents are used), escort the principal to and from his or her room. In some cases, the principal may even move around the hotel to use the gym, eat or attend meetings without his protection team.
The number of attackers involved in the assassination of al-Mabhouh could easily have overpowered one or two close-protection agents, especially if the assassins were able to achieve the element of surprise and were skilled fighters or used weapons. Furthermore, in such a scenario, the close-protection agent(s) would likely be targeted first, to remove the danger they pose before focusing on the principal.
The skill and degree of surveillance exhibited in the al-Mabhouh assassination would have been difficult for an EP team or targeted principal to detect and defend against. It is very difficult for EP agents to focus much attention on surveillance detection, especially in the case of a one- or two-man team. This underscores the need for a comprehensive and professionally trained countersurveillance (CS) team in such situations. The CS team focuses on the events and actors surrounding the principal and the EP detail, and by its very nature is in a far better position to detect hostile surveillance than close-protection agents are.
The surveillance of al-Mabhouh observed on the CCTV footage would likely have been picked up by a deployed CS team. The CS team could then have alerted the EP team to possible threats and allowed the EP team to increase the level of protection and/or notify the appropriate authorities. The very presence of a CS team could also serve to raise the risk of conducting such an operation to the point where another target would be selected.
The al-Mabhouh case also demonstrates the importance of EP teams keeping tabs on the individuals who occupy the hotel rooms in close proximity to their principals. Such rooms can be used as ambush sites when the principal walks through the hall, and in some cases, they can be used to gain entry to the principal’s room through adjoining doorways or from the exterior of the building.
Text
Here ya go.
—
Michael McCullar
Senior Editor, Special Projects
STRATFOR
E-mail: mccullar@stratfor.com
Tel: 512.744.4307
Cell: 512.970.5425
Fax: 512.744.4334
The following EMail gives you a view on President Barak Obamas Leak Investigations – This EMail was not for the Public and marked as “internal use only – pls do not forward”
burton@stratfor.com claims in this EMail a view on Obamas Anti Leaking Investigations not only against Whistleblowers even on journalists that speak out agains Barak Obama.
Brennan is behind the witch hunts of investigative journalists learning information from inside the beltway sources.
This information now is called by me a way interessting stuff as this mail was written John O. Brennan still was obamas chief counterterrorism advisor and now in 2013 he has been turned into the chief director of Central Intelligence Agency.
So not only the hunt on whistleblowers has been opened also the hunt on investigative journalism this is an act against any democratic law and freedom of press.
but this mail will offer you some more information let´s follow the second quote:
Note — There is specific tasker from the WH to go after anyone printing materials negative to the Obama agenda (oh my.) Even the FBI is shocked. The Wonder Boys must be in meltdown mode..
Here is the second proof that an task direct from the white house (WH) comes to hunt investigative journalists that print anything negative on the president of the united states. even the FBI had knowledge of this tasker and is in this mail claimed to be shocked.
So the war on whistleblowers is not the only agenda on the white houses tasks it also includes investigative journalism and anything else that speaks negative on Mr. Obama using leaks or wikileaks as a source or using own collected material that could shine negative loght on the white house.
This Leak will give you proof that CIA, Stratfor and you can easy imagine other Shadow Surveillance Agencys are monitoring the world wide web social medias.
They are talking about in that following leaked EMails.
Have suspected this, but provides an idea of the scope of the surveillance.
CIA Open Source Center in charge of following these social websites. Used to provide a quick sweep of reaction to world events. Have several hundred analysts. Follow about 5 million tweets a day. The listed examples were to the death of UBL, social responses to Obama’s Middle East speech. Started to use this media after the Green Revo. in Iran and how Twitter impacted that. Thought that they would have started monitoring these sites in a systematic way before that.
So what we all know and what we all thought before is now leaked and you have it black and white on your screen right now you as are reading this blogpost.
So there are three Points in that EMail and on two of those I want to shine some light on.
3 things 1. Their job is very very similar to ours with better resources and different requirements 2. Note how they use, caveat, and compare their monitoring of social media 3. There is no organized monitoring of US domestic social media
1. Their job is very very similar to ours with better resources and different requirements
so at the first point Stratfor (SF) says that they are monitoring the social media too like the CIA but the CIA has more massive Computers and resources than SF and different requirements. The CIA Open Source Center was created after the attacks of 9/11 for a better state of the art surveillance of citizens and terrorist activities.
The OSC Leader at the moment is Douglas Naquin. you can imagine that within a more and more networked world through programs like facebook and twitter (spying machines) the resources must have been increased rapidly because we live in a new century of informations.
3. There is no organized monitoring of US domestic social media
this point I would call today a fail. because we know now that the NSA is building a huge Spy Center in USA Utah you can see and hear about this on Jacob Applebaums 29C3 keynote. So it is important to note that not only the CIA OSC, and Stratfor are monitoring Facebook and Twitter or other social medias – also The NSA and for sure Germanys BND and other surveillance Agencys are up into the great spying machine called the internet. and the social media networks are their most powerful tools.
watch full or start at 11:23.
the mail goes on with an important note of an agent.
3. Don’t bet on it. It’s just better hidden
So he claims to be that point 3 is not valid and the monitoring is just better hidden. this is an important note because it is NOT only the CIAs open source center who is monitoring all that social media networks there is more hidden surveillance in the state and all around the internet.
No, not OSC From: Sean Noonan <sean.noonan@stratfor.com> Reply-To: <sean.noonan@stratfor.com>, CT AOR <ct@stratfor.com> Date: Fri, 4 Nov 2011 17:50:07 +0000 To: CT AOR <ct@stratfor.com> Subject: Re: [CT] US/SECURITY – AP Exclusive: CIA following Twitter, Facebook By the CIA OSC?
So what are those important points to know, what can you do to get not in the view of spys and secret agents. well this is way difficult to say. at first try to be anonymous as possible if you don´t want to get “”visited”” by unknown.
use often nicknames on the web. try things like the tor browser and use unix / Linux systems for a better control of your system. you can use VPN and create different mail accounts.
at least it is up to all of you with whom do you talk and what do you share – do you need your real name in facebook? do you need to post pictures of your friends or the latest party? think before posting. what is important what do you need to say and what is to much private information?
I am sure if someone would stay in your house or appartment watching you all the time face 2 face you do not know him and he is not much talking to you. you wouldn´t share or your personal stuff with him. you would ask him to leave.
Talk about this on WikiLeaks Forum (or on this blog 😉 )
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